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On the preference for self-related entities: the
role of positive self-associations in implicit 
egotism effects
The unconscious preference for stimuli that are associated with the self was
called implicit egotism. The idea underlying implicit egotism is that positive feelings
about our self result in positive feelings about anything that is associated with our self.
So, the more positive we feel about our self, the more positive we evaluate stimuli that
are more or less part of our self. However, although these feelings about oneself are a
central and crucial aspect of the theory of implicit egotism, they were not taken into
account in the research on implicit egotism so far. In the present thesis the aim was to
investigate how people vary in the evaluation of self-associated objects as a function of
positivity of self associations.
One contribution of the present thesis is that it shifted the boundaries of what
needs to be explained by introducing yet another area in which name letter-related
egotism was demonstrated: the overuse of name letters in written texts. Moreover, this
dissertation accomplished something that implicit egotism research so far has not been
able to do, namely complete the logical argument concerning implicit egotism effects in
the sense that it represents a spill-over of positive self-associations to anything that is
-one way or another- linked to the self.
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R S
Chapter 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

9ost people like themselves. High levels of self-esteem may have
implications for behavior and decision-making. Recent studies have shown
that people tend to move toward cities that resemble their personal names.
Also, people choose jobs that have names that resemble their own names. 
Furthermore, it was found that people’s decisions to live in a particular street and to marry
a particular person, are (at least partly) based on the similarities of the names of, respec-
tively, these streets and persons with their own name (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, &
Mirenberg, 2004; Pelham, Carvallo, DeHart, & Jones, 2003; Pelham, Mirenberg, &
Jones, 2002). Thus, Dennis is more likely to live in Denver, to become a dentist, to live in
Denier Street and to marry Denise, than one would expect on the basis of chance. 
The unconscious preference for stimuli that are associated with the self was
called implicit egotism. Most people feel good about themselves. Therefore, they like
objects that are associated with the self (Beggan, 1992). Our names are stimuli that are
closely associated with our self and, therefore, the letters constituting our name, i.e., our
name letters, are highly representative for our identity (Dion, 1983). The idea underlying
implicit egotism is that positive feelings about our self result in positive feelings about
anything that is associated with our self. So, the more positive we feel about our self, the
more positive we evaluate stimuli that are more or less part of our self. Consequently, if
Dennis feels good about himself, he should show a preference for self-relevant stimuli,
e.g., the city of Denver, Denier Street, and Denise. The theory would also predict that if
Dennis does not feel good about himself, he should prefer neither Denver, nor Denier
Street, nor Denise.
However, although these feelings about oneself are a central and crucial aspect
of the theory of implicit egotism, they were not taken into account in the studies
described above. We would expect that name letter effects should only be observed for
people who feel good about themselves (i.e., have highly positive implicit self-esteem),
but not for people who feel less good or even bad about themselves (i.e., have low or
even negative implicit self-esteem).
In the present thesis we aim to investigate how people vary in the evaluation of
self-associated objects. The major goal is to elucidate the implications of (implicit)
self-esteem for the processes of implicit egotism. In other words, we look at the
consequences of the level of (implicit) self-esteem for the evaluation of self-relevant and
self-irrelevant stimuli. In this first chapter, we will first review the relevant literature on (the
consequences of) implicit self-esteem and then provide a general framework for our
studies. 
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Although this thesis is about the consequences of implicit evaluations of the self,
we would like to stress that a detailed review of the literature on the self is beyond the
scope of the present thesis. We start by briefly providing a perspective of what is meant
by the ‘self’ and, then from this perspective, continue to discuss the general goal of this
thesis: studying the role of implicit self-esteem in relation to implicit egotism.
A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SELF
When we look at the literature about the self, we find many different self-related
topics1, sometimes referred to as the ‘self-zoo’ (cf. Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, &
Beach, 2000; Smeets & Holland, 2002). Because the term ‘self’ is used in so many
different ways in the literature, it is often hard to pin down what is exactly meant by
authors when they use it. 
To elucidate the different meanings of the self used in articles and textbooks the
following rough taxonomy can be made (see Tangney & Leary, 2003). First, authors use
‘self’ to refer to the ‘person’. The second meaning of the term ‘self’ is synonymous to
‘personality’. A third meaning of self refers to the psychological process involved in
reflexive cognition, the human ability to think about oneself. This meaning of the self
refers to the self-as-knower. The fourth meaning reflects the self-as-known meaning. This
use of ‘self’ refers to the mental representation of people’s thoughts and feelings about
themselves. A fifth meaning of ‘self’ is the ‘agent’ that fulfils the executive function of the
self, the self as a doer, a decision-maker. In the present thesis, we predominantly
consider the latter two meanings of the self: the self as self-as-known and the executive
function of the self. The self is mentally represented and the nature of these mental
representations leads to behavioral consequences.
Considering the mental representation of the self, most students of the self
agree that it is a complex mental structure with cognitive, affective and behavioral
components (see for example Leary & Tangney, 2003; Markus & Wurf, 1987). These
components reflect different sorts of properties and consequences of the self. One such
property is self-esteem, which can be seen as the evaluation of the self-concept. People
evaluate themselves consciously and unconsciously and as a consequence, they hold
positive and negative cognitive as well as affective evaluations about themselves. The
overall valence of this self-evaluation reflects the level of self-esteem.
R S
1 A list of self-related topics would comprise concepts such as self-awareness, self-construal, self-esteem,   
self-affirmation, self-verification, self-presentation, self-regulation, self-rumination, self-compassion,        
self-efficacy, self-categorization, self-enhancement, self-improvement, self-monitoring, self-assessment,       
self-concept, self-handicapping, and identity, to name just a few.
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THE NATURE OF SELF-ESTEEM 
Self-esteem refers to our positive and negative evaluations of ourselves
(Coopersmith, 1967). Like any attitude (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), the attitude towards
the self may be based on cognitive evaluations, affective evaluations and behavioral
information. Cognitive evaluations refer to the thoughts and beliefs we have about
ourselves, while affective evaluations refer to the feelings we, consciously or
unconsciously, have about ourselves. The level of self-esteem is shaped by all kinds of
major and minor life experiences. Therefore, people differ in their levels of self-esteem.
But, despite these differences in self-esteem, people generally strive to enhance it and
are motivated to maintain positive self-esteem (see Sedikedes & Strube, 1997).
There are three major theories that explain our need for self-esteem. First,
Terror Management Theory considers self-esteem as a buffer against (the fear of) our
own death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991). Second, Dominance Theory argues that self-esteem reflects one’s
social dominance status (Barkow, 1975, 1980). Third, Sociometer Theory explains
self-esteem as a monitor revealing our social status (Leary, 1999; Leary & Baumeister,
2000; Leary & Downs, 1995). At a more fundamental level, the latter two theories can be
explained by our “need to belong” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995); people are motivated to
bond with others in relationships that provide ongoing, positive interactions. From an
evolutionary perspective, these positive interactions may have fostered group survival,
because it enhanced cooperation with other group members to the benefit of mutual
protection and nurturance. Of course, positive interactions also facilitate reproduction.  
It is concluded that positive feelings about the self, or high self-esteem, are an
indicator of our chances to survive and therefore, we try to keep our self-esteem high. In
many ways, satisfying the need for self-esteem is critical to our entire outlook on life.
Compared to low self-esteem people, people with high self-esteem tend to be happier,
healthier, more productive, more successful, more confident, more persisting, more
independent and they suffer less often from ulcers. Thus, maintaining positive
self-esteem entails many benefits (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
IMPLICIT SELF
As noted before, we have distinguished three components of self: cognitive,
affective and behavioral components. It was long thought that psychological processes
could best be measured by explicit measures or introspection, e.g., by asking people
what they thought (cognitive responses) and what they felt (affective responses). The
unique human ability of self-reflection was considered the only path to valid knowledge
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of the self. But James (1890) already noted the problem of the self simultaneously being
the knower and the known. The object of study was also the agent who was doing the
studying. Asendorpf, Banse, and Mücke (2002) mentioned two limitations of explicit
measures of the self. First, these measures are highly susceptible to social desirability
biases (Edwards, 1957). People often use explicit measures to present themselves in a
social desirable way leading to inaccurate assessments of the measured trait (Paulhus,
1991). The second problem of self-reports is the limited accessibility of the self via
self-report methods. Some parts of the self are not accessible by introspection (Bargh,
1994; Bosson, Pennebaker, & Swann, 2000; Epstein, 1994).
In the past 20 years, research in social psychology has gradually shifted towards
an increased interest in implicit processes. It was acknowledged that people do not have
full access to the psychological processes that influence everyday behavior, cognitions,
and feelings. Researchers of implicit cognition devised new paradigms for the study of
several traditional topics (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In the present thesis, we use
the term ‘implicit’ to refer to the methodological and empirical way of measuring
automatic and/or uncontrollable processes associated with the self rather than measuring
something as the implicit self (compare Asendorpf, et al., 2002; Fazio & Olson, 2003;
Olson & Fazio, 2002; Tafarodi & Ho, 2006). 
This interest in implicit self-processes resulted in the development of several
implicit self-esteem measures, such as word stem completion measures (Hetts, Sakuma,
& Pelham, 1999; Pelham & Hetts, 1999), evaluative priming tasks (Pelham & Hetts, 1999;
Spalding & Hardin, 1999), the self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Farnham,
Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999), and the name letter measure (Nuttin, 1985).
Bosson et al. (2000) examined several explicit and implicit self-esteem
measures. They found that explicit and implicit measures did not correlate, which led the
authors to conclude that they measure two different constructs (but see; Krizan & Suls,
2008; Pelham, Koole, Hardin, Hetts, Seaha, & DeHart, 2005). Furthermore, they showed
that the available implicit measures hardly correlated with each other, leading the authors
to conclude that different implicit self-esteem measures were measuring different things
or different parts of the same thing. One striking result of their study concerned the
weakness of the statistical properties (e.g., test-retest reliability) of various implicit
self-esteem measures. 
However, one of the implicit self-esteem measures with desirable properties is
the name letter effect (Nuttin, 1985). According to Bosson and colleagues, the name
letter effect is satisfyingly reliable and has good test-retest reliability. For these reasons
we predominantly use the name letter measure in this thesis to measure participants’
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implicit self-esteem. Another reason for this choice is that the name letter effect has been
studied profoundly. However, we stress that implicit self-esteem is not measured
exclusively by the name letter measure (as we will see in Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
THE NAME LETTER EFFECT
Nuttin was the first to show that people have a strong preference for their own
name letters compared to letters that are not in their names (Nuttin, 1985). According to
Nuttin (1985, 1987) and Koole (2000), the name letter effect originates from the very early
development of affect towards our self and our names. As soon as we are aware of our
self, we understand that our name represents us and that we are referred to by our
names. From childhood onwards, the feelings about our self, or the affect associated with
the self also spreads to our names. Guardo and Bohan (1971) found that children find
their name one of the most important aspects of their identity and that they would not be
the same person if their name would be changed. Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979)
showed that 50% of children of the age of 15 months refer to themselves by their name,
a percentage that increases by age. Nuttin (1985, 1987) argued that positive feelings
about the self lead to positive feelings about anything that is associated with the self (see
also Koole & Pelham, 2003). 
Nuttin (1985, 1987) showed that people like their own name letters better than
other letters. He used two (or three) yoked vertical letter strings, which consisted of one
of the participants’ name letters and one (or two) non-name letters with the same
frequency and it was the participants’ task to indicate which letter of each combination of
letters they liked most. Nuttin found that people consistently showed an unconscious
preference for their name letters. In another paradigm Nuttin (1987) used all letters of the
alphabet and participants had to indicate their preference for six letters of the alphabet.
Again he found that people show a preference for their name letters. In this last study he
investigated this effect in several European countries. Kitayama and Karasawa (1997)
showed that this name letter preference also existed in Eastern  countries, like Japan.  
Just as with preference for name letters, Kitayama and Karasawa (1997)
showed that there is also a preference for birthday numbers: The birthday number effect.
People have a strong preference for numbers that refer to their date of birth over other
numbers that do not refer to their date of birth. For example, if Marielle’s birthday was on
the 14th of May, then according to the birthday number effect, she should like the number
14 more than other numbers.
The name letter effect (and birthday number effect) is claimed to be a measure
of implicit self-esteem (See Bosson et al., 2000; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1999; Koole &
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Pelham, 2003). The stronger the preference for one’s name letters (and birthday
numbers), the higher the implicit self-esteem. Before describing the empirical evidence
supporting the idea that the name letter effect reflects implicit self-esteem, we will first
discuss some alternative explanations for the name-letter effect.
DISCRIMINANT VALIDATION OF THE NAME LETTER EFFECT: 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Several alternative explanations have received empirical attention. One of the
alternative explanations for the existence of the name letter effect that received most
attention is the mere exposure explanation (Zajonc, 1968). According to this explanation,
people are exposed to their own name letters more often than to other letters, which
results in a more positive evaluation of own name letters. This explanation cannot
account for name-letter preferences for several reasons.
First, Nuttin (1987) used a design that controlled for the mere exposure
explanation. Participants had to indicate their top six rating of all the letters in the
alphabet. The results showed that people have a preference for their name letters over
letters that or not in their names, irrespective of the frequency of that letter. If the mere
exposure explanation were true, he should have found a preference for the most frequent
letters in the alphabet.
Second, Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002) found that even people
whose name letters were relatively rare in English language (Z, X, W, J, K), showed a
preference for name letters. These people liked these rare letters even more than the
most common letters in English (E, S). A mere exposure explanation cannot explain this
finding, because even when your name contains such a rare letter, you would not come
across it more often than E or S. Third, the mere exposure explanation cannot be
accurate because of the asymptotic effect of repeated exposure on liking. Although mere
exposure breeds liking, it has been shown that when the number of exposures exceeds
20 times, the evaluation of the exposed object no longer increases (Bornstein, 1989;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Because we encounter our name letters and all other letters
far more frequently than 20 times every day, it is unlikely that any additional exposure to
name letters still has an incremental evaluation effect. Fourth, another finding that
contradicts the mere exposure explanation, is the fact that women especially like the first
letter of their first name and men especially like the first letter of their last name. Because
it is unlikely that men and women differ in their exposure to their first and last initials
(Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997) this result would be at odds with a mere exposure
explanation. In sum, these findings suggest that the mere exposure does not constitute
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a plausible alternative explanation for the name letter effect. 
Hoorens (1990) wrote an interesting paper in which she ruled out two additional
alternative explanations for the name letter effect: The ‘primacy of mastery’ explanation
and the ‘subjective familiarity’ hypothesis. 
The first alternative explanation mentioned by Hoorens (1990) is the ‘primacy of
mastery explanation’ which argues that people’s name letters are the very first letters
children learn to read and write (see also Justice, Pence, Bowles, & Wiggins, 2006) and
that this is accompanied by such an intense ‘mastery’ affect, that the (name) letters
associated with it remain preferred throughout a person’s lifetime (Hoorens & Todorova,
1988). So, learning to write your own name raises such an intense pleasant feeling that
this feeling remains associated with your name letters for years. If this explanation were
true, the name letter effect should be the strongest in the years shortly after you learned
to write your name. Nevertheless, the name letter effect is also observed in an alphabet
that was learned in a later stage of life, usually in high school. Thus, Greek people show
the name letter effect in their native Greek alphabet, but also in the later learned western
alphabet. These findings render the primacy of mastery explanation for the name-letter
effect less plausible (see also Hoorens, Nuttin, Erdélyi Herman, & Pavakanun, 1990).
The second alternative explanation described by Hoorens (1990) is the
‘subjective familiarity’ hypothesis that states that people show a preference for their name
letters because these letters seem more familiar to them than other letters do, due to the
high accessibility of the self-structure in memory (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984) and the
prominent place of one’s own name in the self-concept (Dion, 1983), causing a
subjective exposure phenomenon that enhances name letters’ attractiveness. If this
hypothesis were valid, it should also be expected that the frequency overestimation of
name letters would correlate with name letter preference. Researchers found an
overestimation of name letter frequency, but this was independent of name letter
preference (cf. Hoorens, 1990). Thus, the subjective familiarity hypothesis cannot explain
the name letter effect. 
AFFIRMATIVE VALIDATION OF THE NAME LETTER EFFECT: THE NAME
LETTER EFFECT AS A REFLECTION OF IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM
The next question that must be addressed is whether the name letter effect is a
reflection of implicit self-esteem. Koole and Pelham (2003) argued that because of the
positive attitude most people have toward the self (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister,
1982; Greenwald, 1980; Koole & Sedikides, 2000; Myers & Ridl, 1979; Taylor & Brown,
1988), a positivity bias toward self-associated stimuli may be interpreted as indirect
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evidence of implicit self-esteem. They formulated four properties that the name letter
measure should possess in order to consider name letter preferences to be valid
indicators of implicit self-esteem. 
First, name letters should be associated to the self. Dion (1983) stated that there
is a close connection between an individual’s name and his/her personal identity and
sense of self. Other authors went further by arguing that our name is a central aspect of
the self-concept (Bugental & Zelen, 1950). From our earliest youth we learn a strong
association between ourselves and our names. Children start recognizing themselves in
mirrors at the same time they start referring to themselves by their own name (Darwin,
1877). Sherif and Cantril (1947) suggested that during infancy, the child learns its name
and around this name it gathers many characteristics that define its psychological
identity. Guardo and Bohan (1971) asked children to name the main parts of their selves
and they found that children find their names one of the most important constituents of
their identity. 
When asked who they are, people often answer by expressing their name, even
when they were instructed to consider the questionnaire anonymous (Bugental & Zelen,
1950). Holt (1939; cited in Dion, 1983) asked people if they could imagine being named
anything else and still be the same person that they were. Most participants reported that
they would be another person. According to Sherif and Cantril (1947) most people may
not be aware of how much their names are part of themselves. We are pleased to notice
when an old acquaintance remembers our name and we feel hurt when a person who
should know our name has forgotten it. Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, and Maio (2008)
showed that the answer to the question “how much do you like your name?” is a good
reflection of someone’s global self-esteem. Taken together, we may conclude that our
name letters have a strong association with the self.
Second, given the fact that most people possess positive self-views, name
letter evaluations should be positively biased, at least for most people. As has been noted
above, this is the case. Most people show a positive bias towards their own name letters.
This effect was first found by Nuttin (1985) who instructed participants to choose the most
attractive letter out of a two or three letter combination. More recently, the name letter
effect has also been measured by asking participants to evaluate all letters of the
alphabet (e.g., Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 1999). The name letter effect is
a very robust phenomenon that was found in different countries, in different cultures,
using different measures, using different alphabets and using different  letter styles (e.g.,
capitals vs. lower case letters) (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987). In the
empirical chapters of this thesis, we will repeatedly find such a preference for name
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letters. To conclude, people are positively biased to their own name letters.
Third, people should have little or no awareness that they show a preference for
their own name letters. Nuttin (1985) found the name letter effect using letter strings in
which participant’s names were included and he encouraged participants to discover a
structure in these letter strings. None of the participants discovered the consistent
occurrence of name letters in the letter strings. Likewise Nuttin, in our studies no single
participant came up with the idea that we were measuring preference for own name
letters (see also Koole et al., 1999). 
Fourth, the preference people show for their own name letters should be
uniquely attributable to the association between name letters and the self. Explicit
strategic considerations for name letter preferences can be excluded, because there are
no benefits of preferring name letters in a pragmatic or material sense. 
We add a fifth property to this list of conditions for the name letter effect to be a
measure of implicit self-esteem. If the name-letter effect is related to the implicit
evaluation of the self, it should be sensitive to self-esteem manipulations. Indeed, it has
been shown that the name letter effect is susceptible to success or failure feedback
(Koole et al., 1999; Smeets & Holland, 2002). People show a drop in their name letter
evaluations after a self-esteem threat and a rise after a self-esteem boost. More
pertinently, recent studies on evaluative conditioning and affective priming have provided
evidence for the unconscious nature of evaluative name letter processes (Baccus,
Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004). For example, in several studies,
Dijksterhuis subliminally conditioned words like ‘I’ or ‘me’ with positive traits and showed
that people’s name letter evaluations subsequently increased. The link between the
name-letter effect and the implicit evaluation of the self has also been elucidated by
means of an affective priming paradigm. Wentura, Kulfanek, and Greve (2005) used such
a paradigm to study people’s affective associations with their initials. Participants were
primed with their initials and subsequently exposed to strongly valenced adjectives.
Participants were asked to press a key as quickly as possible to indicate whether the
presented word was positive or negative. In line with the idea that name-letters are
automatically evaluated, in trials in which participant’s initials were primed before the
adjective, facilitated responses of positive adjectives and inhibited responses of negative
adjectives were obtained.
In sum, given the empirical evidence thus far, it is safe to conclude that the
name letter effect can be considered a valid indicator of implicit self-esteem. Our own
data presented in this thesis further corroborate this idea.
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLICIT EGOTISM
In the literature, there are several indications that when other people share
important features with us our evaluations of and behavior towards these people are
more positive than those concerning unrelated people. Finch and Cialdini (1989) found
that people, who shared their birthday with a disliked other person, evaluated this
person less negatively. A study by Miller, Downs, and Prentice (1998) showed that
sharing a birthday with another person led participants to be more cooperative in a
competitive situation. When participants had to allocate money in a social dilemma game,
they gave the other person more money when they shared their birthday with this other
person. Burger, Messian, Patel, Del Prado, and Anderson (2004) showed that people are
more likely to comply with a request of someone who shared their birthday, their first
name or fingerprint features. Thus, you have more positive evaluations of and display
more positive social behavior toward the people you share arbitrary properties with, like
e.g., your birthday than you do towards people lacking these similarities. 
Recent research by Pelham et al. (2002) showed that these consequences of
sharing features are not limited to evaluations and action in relation to minor decisions
and behaviors. They described an interesting set of ten studies, using archival data, in
which they showed that name letter preferences may influence major life decisions such
as the place to live and what to do for a living. They found that people are
disproportionately likely to live in places the names of which resemble their own first or
last names (e.g., Dennis who lives in Denver). They found that people are
overrepresented in cities and states that resembled their names, compared to chance
expectancies of name prevalence (e.g., George who lives in Georgia). In addition to the
evaluation of letters, researchers have also focused on the evaluation of numbers as a
function of egotism, i.e., the birthday number effect. The birthday number effect consists
of the finding that people have an over-preference for numbers that refer to their date of
birth. This effect was capitalized on in yet another study of Pelham et al. (2002). They
investigated city names that contain numbers, like Two Harbours, Three Forks, or Five
Points. The researchers found that people tend to live more often in a city containing
reference to their birthday number (e.g., people with the number 2 in their date of birth
were overrepresented in the city of Two Harbours). Subsequent studies showed similar
findings with regard to streets (e.g., Mary lives in Mainstreet), type of jobs that people
have (e.g., Dennis is dentist) or businesses that people started (e.g., Carl Jakobsen
started Carlsberg beer).
Probably, major life decisions are not only based on very well considered
motives and arguments, but they are often taken in a more unconscious, automatic way,
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which is at variance with existing ideas about rational choice. Overall, the findings of
Pelham et al. with regard to peoples’ gravitation toward self-related cities, states, and jobs
constitute intriguing demonstrations of the consequences of implicit egotism. Recently,
Anseel and Duyck (2008) showed in an intriguing study that people are more likely to
work for companies with initials matching their own than to work for companies with other
initials. 
Jones et al. (2004) provided additional empirical evidence for the consequences
of implicit egotism. They showed that implicit egotism also has interpersonal
consequences. The researchers found that participants were more attracted to people
whose arbitrary experimental code numbers was similar to their own birthday numbers
than were people who did not share their birthday numbers with these people. They also
found that participants felt more attracted to people whose surnames resembled their
own surnames. In four studies they found that people are disproportionately likely to
marry someone whose first letter of the last name is also part of their own name. In the
final study of their paper they subliminally paired a number with the participants’ names.
By doing so, the self-relevance of the number was enhanced. After this, participants
viewed a picture of a girl wearing a sweater with a specific number on it. They found that
participants were more strongly attracted to the girl when she wore a sweater with the
number that was paired with their name than when the sweater displayed a control
number. So implicit egotism also involves judgments about other people and choices for
life mates. 
Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, and Carvallo (2005) found similar results. They
manipulated the brand name of beverages so that the brand name started with letters
from participants’ first name or not. Participants were more likely to choose the product
with the brand that started with their name letters. Holland, Wennekers, Bijlstra,
Jongeneelen, and Van Knippenberg (in press; see also Bijlstra, Jongenelen, Wennekers,
Holland, Smeets, & van Knippenberg, 2006) showed that people drink more of a
beverage when its brand name contains name letters compared to a non-name letters
beverage.
Nelson and Simmons (2007) showed that people are even attracted to name
letter-related behaviors that are normally consciously avoided. For instance, pupils
whose names started with a ‘C’ or a ‘D’ were more likely to have poor grades than pupils
whose names started with an ‘A’ or a ‘B’.
Chandler, Griffin, and Sorenson (2008) found that name letters also play a role
in donations for victims of a hurricane. Individuals who shared an initial with the
hurricane name were overrepresented among hurricane relief donors relative to the
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baseline distribution of initials in the donor population.
It is clear that that the effects of implicit egotism go beyond trivial preferences or
decisions. Also major life decisions may (partly) ensue from implicit egotism. However,
we think this is not the whole story and therefore we will extend the research on implicit
egotism in the present thesis.
EXTENDING THE RESEARCH ON IMPLICIT EGOTISM
Although the consequences of implicit egotism described above are intriguing
and sometimes even astonishing, the data are also limited in important ways. First, the
level of implicit self-esteem is a central construct in the theorizing about implicit egotism.
The theory is based on the idea that positive feelings about the self result in a more
positive evaluation of anything that is associated with the self, like name letters, birthday
numbers, cities which names resemble our names, interaction partners who share
attributes, etc. Although most people have a positive attitude toward their self (Banaji &
Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1982; Greenwald, 1980; Koole et al., 2000; Myers & Ridl,
1979; Taylor & Brown, 1988) the level of (implicit) self-esteem is an individual difference
variable that shows considerable variance between people. According to the theory of
implicit egotism, the enhanced evaluation of stimuli that are associated with the self is
expected to be confined to people with high implicit self-esteem. Therefore, it can be
hypothesized that only people with high (implicit) self-esteem engage in implicit egotism
and those with low implicit self-esteem will not. Thus far, these crucial hypotheses
concerning implicit egotism have been largely neglected (see however Gawronksi,
Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007). 
THE PRESENT THESIS
The aim of this thesis is to extend the research on implicit egotism. In Chapter
2, we present an entirely new implicit egotism phenomenon. We reasoned that if people
have a strong preference for their name letters, they might also show an overuse of these
letters in written text production. And if so, people might especially do this in positive
words but not in negative words. We tested the hypotheses that people use more name
letters in written texts (Study 2.1), that the level of implicit self-esteem moderates this
effect (Study 2.2) and that the effect is stronger for positive words compared to negative
words (Study 2.3).
In Chapter 3, we tested the hypothesis that people with high implicit  self-esteem
like self-relevant objects better than people with low implicit self-esteem. For products
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that are not self-relevant no such differences in evaluation were expected. In Studies 3.1
and 3.2, we measured implicit self-esteem and participants were exposed to an
advertisement of a self-relevant product and a non self-relevant product. Self-relevance
was manipulated by either including name-letters of the participant or non-name letters in
the name of the product. Finally, the evaluation of the product was measured. 
In Chapter 4, we studied whether implicit egotism goes beyond name letter
preferences and we tested whether the level of implicit self-esteem moderates the
evaluation (Study 4.1) or the allocated price (Study 4.2) of a product that we either do or
do not possess. We expected that only people high in implicit self-esteem would
evaluate a product that they possessed more positively than a product that they did not
possess. For people low in implicit self-esteem we did not expect an effect of
possession. In both studies the product was made self-relevant by telling participants in
the experimental condition that the product was theirs and that they could keep it. 
In Chapter 5, we summarize the results of this thesis and discuss them in terms
of the relevant theories about implicit self-esteem and implicit egotism. We also discuss
some directions for future research. Chapters 2 to 4 can be read as independent
empirical chapters. As a consequence, some sections within these chapters may partly
overlap.
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Most
people feel good about
themselves and, therefore, they
like objects that are associated with
the self (Beggan, 1992). Because our
names constitute a cherished aspect of our
self, our name letters are important self-symbols
which are highly representative for our identity
(Dion, 1983). One’s implicit self-esteem is reflected
in one’s name letter evaluations (Koole et al., 1999;
Nuttin, 1987). Therefore, people like their name let-
ters. This name letter effect (Nuttin, 1985) is a very
robust effect that was shown in many countries, in
different cultures and using different alphabets
(Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987).
The preference for self-associated
objects is referred to as implicit
egotism (Pelham et al.,
2002). Name 
Because
people in general
prefer own name letters
to other letters, we expect
them to display an enhanced
use of name letters in written
texts. For instance, we
would expect that a text
written by Lea
does it
In
general, it may be
argued that people prefe-
rentially engage in behaviors
they like, eat foods they like and
go out with friends they like.
Children prefer to play with toys
they like, and people tend to
wear their favorite clothes and
watch their favorite TV
programs. 
Chapter 2
EXPRESSING YOUR SELF IN WRITING:
THE USE OF NAME LETTERS IN TEXTS
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s we have seen in Chapter 1, most people hold positive attitudes towards
themselves (Koole, 2000). A positive self-attitude, or high self-esteem can be
seen as a reflection of one’s ‘social success’ (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) and
is found to be associated to several positive outcomes. People use a whole
range of self-protective and self-enhancing strategies to protect, repair and keep their
high level of self-esteem (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). 
Most people feel good about themselves and, therefore, they like objects that
are associated with the self (Beggan, 1992). Because our names constitute a cherished
aspect of our self, our name letters are important self-symbols which are highly
representative for our identity (Dion, 1983). One’s implicit self-esteem is reflected in one’s
name letter evaluations (Koole et al., 1999; Nuttin, 1987). Therefore, people like their
name letters. This name letter effect (Nuttin, 1985) is a very robust effect that was shown
in many countries, in different cultures and using different alphabets (Kitayama &
Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987). The preference for self-associated objects is referred to
as implicit egotism (Pelham et al., 2002).
Name letters may have implications for decision-making and behavior. Recently,
Anseel and Duyck (2008) showed in an intriguing study that people are more likely to
work for companies with initials matching their own than to work for companies with other
initials. Earlier studies have shown that people tend to move toward cities that resemble
their personal names. Also, people choose jobs which names resemble their own names.
Furthermore, it was found that people’s decisions to live in a specific street and to marry
a particular person, was (at least partly) based on the similarities with their own names
(Jones et al., 2004; Pelham et al., 2003; Pelham et al., 2002). Thus, Dennis is more
likely to live in Denver, to become a dentist, to live in Denier Street and to marry Denise,
than one would expect on the basis of chance. 
Underscoring the idea that self-symbols influence decisions and behavior
implicitly, Nelson and Simmons (2007) showed that people are attracted to behaviors that
are relevant to their name letters even when these behaviors are normally consciously
avoided (e.g., getting a ‘C’ or a ‘D’ in class). In other words, name letters may
unconsciously influence behavior even when it is undesirable.
In general, it may be argued that people preferentially engage in behaviors they
like, eat foods they like and go out with friends they like. Children prefer to play with toys
they like, and people tend to wear their favorite clothes and watch their favorite TV
programs. Considering that some behavioral name letter effects are engaged in
unconsciously (e.g., getting lower grades, see Nelson & Simmons, 2007), one may
wonder what the limitations are of the preferential adoption of name letter-related
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behaviors. For instance, would the general preference for own name letters also extend
to their preferential use in language production? In other words, if people have a
preference for their own name letters, would this unconsciously entice them to use these
letters more often when they say or write something?
Research has demonstrated that people show an unconscious bias for positive
self-relevant memories (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). It is quite possible that people also
better remember events involving name letters compared to those involving non-name
letters. There may even be a better memory for words containing name letters than for
other words. There is as far as we know no extant research on the issue of preferential
name letter memory in the domain of episodic memory. Our present research question,
however, addresses a more fundamental question concerning semantic memory that
may be tangentially related.
It is quite conceivable that on an implicit, associative level, words containing
name letters have over time become more accessible in memory and are, therefore,
more often used in spontaneous language production. Although it is not clear whether the
processes and rules of language production processes permit such a bias, but it would
be an interesting issue to investigate. Until now empirical evidence for this intriguing
hypothesis is lacking.
Consistent with this idea, we propose that a person’s preference for own name
letters will, in principle, be (unconsciously) manifested in all preferences, behavioral
decisions and actions in which letters are involved. Thus, name letter preference may not
only be reflected in the specific long term life decisions listed above, but in all other
preferences, productions, choices and behavior involving letters, however short-lived or
trivial they may be. This generalization includes, e.g., preferences for products, brands
and shops, liking for popular figures and politicians, evaluations of specific objects,
actual voting and buying behavior and, last but not least, spoken and written language
production. 
Because people in general prefer own name letters to other letters, we expect
them to display an enhanced use of name letters in written texts. For instance, we would
expect that a text written by Lea does contain more ‘L’s than a text written by Bert. We
expect this to be the case for any kind of written text, e.g., scientific articles, abstracts,
short essays, shopping lists, etc. 
It may be important to distinguish between different kinds of written texts. For
instance, scientific publications are relatively formal and subject to a long and scrutinized
editorial process in which words are added, changed and deleted. These texts result from
a fairly slow and deliberative production process. Conversely, there are also many types
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of informal, quickly produced texts like in an email or in a short essay written on the spot.
These different kinds of texts might show differences in letter composition because of the
different production procedures involved (e.g., scrutinized and formal vs. spontaneous
and informal). 
In line with our general argument outlined in Chapter 1, we expect the level of
implicit self-esteem to moderate name letter text production. The level of implicit
self-esteem plays a crucial role in the theory of implicit egotism and therefore we expect
to obtain a correlation between implicit self-esteem and name letter use. 
To summarize we expect a general overuse of own name letters in both formal
and informal written texts. Furthermore, we expect the overuse of own name letters in
written texts to be correlated with implicit self-esteem. Obviously, these texts are made
up of all kinds of words, mostly fairly neutral words, but some words are probably
clearly positive while others are negative. An additional question addressed in this
chapter is whether own name letters are more frequently used in positive than in
negative words.
In the present research we investigated (name) letter production in written texts
and words, in three different studies using different kinds of texts. In Study 2.1, we
investigated letter use in formal, scrutinized texts in abstracts of one volume of the
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. In Study 2.2, we investigated letter use in
informal, spontaneous texts like a short essay. Again we analyzed name letter usage. In
Study 2.3, we tested the moderating role of word valence in letter use. We expected to
obtain a relatively greater use of name letters in the written texts (Study 2.1 and 2.2) and
a specific overuse of name letters in positive valenced words and not in negative
valenced words (Study 2.3).
Study 2.1
In the present study we investigated name letter production bias in a formal
context, i.e., abstracts of scientific articles. We counted letter frequencies in each abstract
and we expected the name letters of the (first) author to be overrepresented in the
abstracts. This idea is partly based on a personal communication with Brett Pelham
(2001).
Method
In this study we used all abstracts of the articles that were published in 2005 in
the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. We counted the letters that were used
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in these abstracts and used the name letters of the first author to indicate whether a
letter was a name letter or not. 
Procedure
In this study we used the 118 first author names and the abstracts of all articles
published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in 2005. We counted the
letters used in the abstracts and marked the letters from the first author’s name (i.e., first
and last name).
We first counted the number of times each of the 26 letters was used in the
abstracts. So per abstract we obtained a score for the ‘A’, and ‘B’, ‘C’, and so on. To
correct these scores for abstract length, we divided these 26 scores by the overall
number of letters used in the abstract to obtain a score per letter for every (single)
abstract.
Subsequently, we obtained a ‘mean norm score per letter’ based on the letters
used in all abstracts, by computing for every single letter, a mean norm score of all
authors that did not have that particular letter in their names. Per author we computed a
difference score for every name letter by subtracting the mean norm score for every
single letter from the individual name letter score for every single name letter. By
averaging these difference scores, we obtained per author one difference score
indicating the relative use of name letters. We based this measure on the Kitayama and
Karasawa (1997) procedure for calculating the name letter effect.
This procedure can be executed for all name letters to compute the name letter
production effect. It is also possible to do this for the letters of the first name only (first
name letter production effect) to demonstrate preferential production of the letters in the
first name. The same is possible for the letters of the last name (last name letter
production effect). All three effects were computed in the present study.
Results
In order to test the hypothesis that authors show an overuse of name letters in
scientific texts we conducted a one-sample t-test on the difference score, using zero as
the test value. We found an effect on the whole name, Mdif = 0.13, t(117) = 5.60, p < .01,
indicating that authors use their name letters relatively more often in their abstracts. Only 
looking at the letters of the first name2, we also found the expected effect, Mdif = 0.10,
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t(117) = 2.39, p < .05. Furthermore, a significant effect for the letters of the last name3 was
also obtained, Mdif = 0.15, t(117) = 3.78, p < .01. 
Discussion
We found that authors of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Volume,
2005) articles use their name letters more often in their abstracts than one would expect
based on general letter frequency in these abstracts. We counted the number of (name)
letters of the first author in the abstracts of their articles and found that name letters were
overrepresented in these texts. Apparently people do not only prefer their name letters,
they also use them more in written language. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
demonstration of overproduction of name letters in written texts. 
Of course the nature of these scientific texts is very formal. In formal
environments one is more often referred to by the last name and less often by the first
name. In scientific publications as well as in scientific environments like conferences and
lectures, the authors are often referred to by their last names. So, when writing a
scientific article, the context might be more associated with the last name than with the
first name. This may account for the results showing that the effect for the letters of
thelast name seemed slightly stronger than the effect of the first name. 
The texts that we analyzed in this study were the result of a slow production
process in which words were deliberately chosen, reconsidered, sometimes maybe
removed, and maybe inserted again by the (first) author. The words were scrutinized by
the first author and maybe also by one or more co-authors. So the texts under
investigation were well considered and subject to a careful editing process. Even though
it is difficult to assess the role of co-authors in the writing process, we obtained a clear
first author name letter production effect.
In Study 2.2 we asked people to spontaneously write a short essay about a
trivial subject like a dishwasher instead of a formal scientific publication. Although this
study is a conceptual replication of Study 2.1, there are two mayor differences. First, the
texts under investigation are not the result of a very well scrutinized process, but are
written quickly and spontaneously. In a way these texts reflect ‘online’ language
production to a much larger extent than article abstracts in journals. Second, the context
in Study 2.2 is informal. In informal situations people are more often referred to by their
first names. Informal situations are thus associated with first names and therefore we
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expect the name letter effect in this study to be stronger for the first names than for the
last names.
Study 2.2 differs in yet another way from Study 2.1. As outlined in Chapter 1, we
would expect, in general, name letter preference effects to be contingent on positive
implicit self-esteem. That is, we expect people to display name letter preferences only
when they have positive implicit self-esteem and not when self-esteem is negative.
Therefore, it would be useful to study implicit self-esteem as a moderator of name letter
effects. Now, while we have not been able to obtain implicit self-esteem data from the first
authors in JPSP, volume 2005, we aim to measure implicit self-esteem in Study 2.2 by
means of a name letter measure. 
Study 2.2
In this study we investigated participants’ letter use in short essays that were
written during the experiment. We counted the letter frequencies in each essay and we
expected the use of participants’ name letters to be correlated with the participants’ level
of implicit self-esteem.
Method
Participants
86 Students of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this study. They
received € 1, - for participation. 
Procedure
Participants were seated individually in a cubicle behind a computer and started
with the experiment. They were told that this was a study on ‘the relation between
visual and linguistic information’ and that the computer would give all the instructions.
Participants were asked to write a description of the appearance and the functioning of a
dishwasher as if explaining it to a blind person. Participants were instructed to type this
description on a computer. Nothing was said about the number of words that should be
used; participants were allowed to use as many words as they needed to explain a
dishwasher. 
We first counted the number of times each of the 26 letters were used in the text
produced by the participants. The procedure to obtain the 26 difference scores per
person (the difference in frequency of name letters and non-name letters) that were
needed for the analysis was identical to the one used in Study 2.1.
The level of implicit self-esteem was assessed using Nuttin’s name letter
R SChapte
r
 2
31
measure, which was introduced as a study of intuitive judgments of simple stimuli (Nuttin,
1985; see also Koole et al.,1999). Participants were asked to intuitively evaluate letters
of the alphabet as quickly as possible on a 5 point scale (1 = not at all beautiful to 5 =
very beautiful). The 26 letters of the alphabet were presented in random order. The name
letter effect was calculated using a procedure proposed by Kitayama and Karasawa
(1997). Firstly, we computed 26 norm evaluation scores, by calculating the mean
evaluation of each letter, only using the letter evaluations of people whose names did not
contain this letter. Then, for every letter of the participant’s name (first and last name),
norm evaluation scores were subtracted from the participant’s evaluation score of the
name letters. The name letter effect is the average of these difference scores. The 26
letters of the alphabet were presented in random order.
After participants completed the name letter measure, they had to write down
their full names (i.e., their first and last name). This was done after the experiment
because we did not want to make their name letters more accessible by priming them
with their own names. After being debriefed, they were thanked and paid. Participants
were all ignorant with regard to the hypothesis under investigation.  
Results
In order to test the hypothesis that people have a tendency to overuse their
name letters in texts, we conducted a one-sample t-test on the difference score, using
zero as the test value. People did not use the letters of their whole name more than
non-name letters, Mdif = 0.02, t(85) = 0.70, n.s. However, when we only looked at the
letters in the first name, we found a significant effect, Mdif = 0.19, t(85) = 3.29, p < .01.
So participants used the letters in their first name more than average. Using only the
letters in the last name, we did not find any effect, Mdif = -0.04, t(85) = 0.90, n.s.
We obtained a significant difference between the use of the name letters of the first name
and the name letters of the last name, t(85) = 3.46, p < .01. People used more name
letters of their first name than of their last name in the texts. Subsequently we tested
whether this name letter use is associated with the level of implicit self-esteem. This was
not the case, Beta = .01, t(85) = 0.08, p > .90, n.s.
Discussion
As we expected, again we found that name letters are overrepresented in
written texts. People not only use their name letters more in important, scientific texts, but
also use their name letters more in written texts about trivial everyday topics like a
dishwasher. People’s name letter preferences are reflected in an unconsciously
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augmented use of these name letters expressed in different kinds of texts.
As we expected, Study 2.2 revealed only effects for first name letters and not for
the last name or the whole name. As we mentioned before, the context is important for
the name letter production effects. Clearly the texts that were studied in Study 2.1 and 2.2
are very different. The texts used in Study 2.1 were quite formal. In such formal
publication settings authors are usually referred to by their last name. The texts in Study
2.2 concerned a more daily and informal topic and were written in an environment where
one is usually referred to by one’s first name. So, as a tentative explanation of our
present results we propose that it depends on the nature of the text, whether it is more
formal (last name) or more informal (first name), whether first name letters last name
letters will be overused in language production.
In Study 2.2 we asked participants to write down a description of a dishwasher,
so we manipulated the topic to write about. It is possible that this specific topic could have
activated the use of specific words and therefore specific letters. Because participants
had to think of a dishwasher, it is possible that certain words or specific letters
associated with a dishwasher became more accessible. This increased accessibility of
certain letters could have led to an augmented use of these specific letters. If these
letters happen to be overrepresented in common (Dutch) first names, this might explain
the effect. This co-occurrence explanation cannot be ruled out totally with our current
data, but if we delete all dishwasher-related words from the analyses, we obtain the same
results4. It is unlikely that this would be the case if the effect were fully caused by the
co-occurrence of letters in names and dishwasher-related words. However, in Study 2.3,
we will not manipulate the topic that participants will have to write on, so this way the
current alternative explanation will be addressed anyway.
In Study 2.2 it turned out that implicit self-esteem did not moderate the
preferential use of own name letters in language production. This suggests that
preference for letters may not be the main driving force in the on-line production of
written text. Before we expand on possible mechanisms underlying this effect, we will
study preferential name letter use in a somewhat different set-up.
In Study 2.3 again, we again investigate the use of name letters in a language
production task. While in the previous study we used two different types of text (formal
vs. informal) to study name letter use, the present study focuses on potentially different
effects as a function of word valence. Because the hypothesized enhanced name letter
use is ultimately based on the assumed liking for own name letters (i.e., a positivity
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effect), it may also be the case that the enhanced name letter use preferentially occurs
in positive words rather than negative words. In a way, within the constraints of the Dutch
lexicon and letter composition of Dutch names, using more positive name letters in
positive words and using less positive name letter words in negative words, may be
interpreted as an evaluative congruency effect. We will investigate the use of (name)
letters in positive and negative valenced words in Study 2.3.
Study 2.3
In this study we investigated (name) letter use in positive and negative valenced
words that were produced by participants during the experiment. We counted the letter
frequencies in each word and we expected the participant’s name letters to be
overrepresented in the positively valenced words and underrepresented in negatively
valenced words.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 61 students of Leiden University, the Netherlands, who were
paid € 1, -. We used a 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (Order: positive first vs.
negative first) mixed design, using the number of (name) letters as the dependent
variable. The valence factor was manipulated within Ss and the order was manipulated
between Ss.
Procedure
Participants were welcomed and seated behind a PC in an individual cubicle.
They were told that the instructions would be given by the computer. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the two Order conditions. They were asked to write down 5
words that have a positive meaning to the participant. Subsequently, participants were
asked to write down 5 words that have a negative meaning. In order 2, participants first
wrote down the negative words and then continued with the positive words. It was told
that they should write down these words as quickly as possible without considering the
words and that they had to write down words that have a positive or negative meaning to
them personally and not to write down words that have a positive or negative meaning in
general. By using this instruction, we tried to obtain variance in the words that were
reported and to avoid the use of the standard positive and negative words that are
commonly used in experiments with which many participants may have been familiar. As
in Study 2.2, the word production phase was followed by a measure of the name letter
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effect. Participants were asked to evaluate all 26 letters of the alphabet, that were
presented on the computer screen in random order. Finally, we asked participants to write
down their names.
We computed the name letter frequencies for both word categories separately.
The procedure was identical to the one described in Study 2.1. We followed the
procedure for the positive and the negative words separately. By averaging the 26
difference scores for every participant (obtained from the difference between the number
of name letters and non-name letters), we obtained one difference score for every
participant indicating the relative use of name letters in the produced positive words and
one difference score for the negative words. None of the participants guessed the true
nature of the hypothesis.
Results
Because the variable ‘Order’ did not produce any significant effects, it was
discarded from the analyses. 
In order to test whether people more often use name letters in positive words
and less often use name letters in negative words, we conducted a paired sample t-test,
comparing the name letter use in negative words with the name letter use in positive
words. We found an effect of word valence, t(60) = 5.93 p < .01. People used more name
letters in positive words (Mdif = 0.46, SD = 0.77) than they did in negative words (Mdif =
-0.47, SD = 0.88). 
To test whether the name letter frequency in positive words was larger than the
mean letter frequency we conducted a one-sample t-test on the difference score, using
zero as the test value. We found the expected effect that people use their name letters
more often in positively valenced words than non name letters (Mdif = 0.46, SD = 0.77),
t(60) = 4.71, p < .01. We also found the effect for the letters in the first name (Mdif = 0.62,
SD = 1.51), t(60) = 3.22, p < .01; and the last name (Mdif = 0.33, SD = 1.16), t(60) = 2.26,
p < .02.
For the negative words we found, as expected, the opposite effect: people used
name letters less frequently than non name letters in negatively valenced words (Mdif =
-0.47, SD = 0.88), t(60) = -4.19, p < .01. The same effects were found for the letters in
the first name (Mdif = -0.70, SD = 1.74), t(60) = -3.13, p < .01; and the last name (Mdif =
-0.54, SD = 1.16), t(60) = -3.16, p < .01.
In subsequent tests, it was examined whether implicit self esteem moderates
the obtained effect. This was not the case: the level of implicit self-esteem did not predict
name letter use, Beta = -.01, t(60) = -0.10, p > .90, n.s.
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Discussion
In the present study we found that people show an overuse of name letters in
words with a positive meaning. Interestingly, the effect is reversed for negative words:
People tend to avoid name letters in words with a negative meaning. 
As argued in our introduction of Study 2.3, the over-occurrence of name letters
in positive words, and their under-occurrence in negative words may reflect an
evaluative congruency effect. Alternatively, it could be that even in the production of
language people are subject to self-enhancement and –protection processes. That is,
people may be eager to use their name letters in positive words, but reluctant to use them
in negative words to enhance or protect their self-esteem respectively. 
However, because word production in spoken and written language seems a
predominantly automatic process (Levelt, 1989), the strategic use of name letters in
positive words and their strategic avoidance in negative words, seems implausible.
Although it is still possible that self-enhancement and self-protection effects operate at an
automatic level, the occurrence of unconscious congruency effects may constitute a more
plausible explanation for the present findings.
As we have argued, we believe that the context of the text is relevant for which
name letters are used more (first or last name). In a more formal context people use more
last name letters (Study 2.1) and in a more informal context, people use more first name
letters (Study 2.2). The data in Study 2.3 are consistent with this idea. The context in this
study was, like in Study 2.2 informal, so that we expect the effects to be the strongest for
first name letters. Indeed, the difference between name letter use in positive and
negative words was stronger for the letters in the first name than for letters in the last
name, t(60)= 1.43, p < .06.
General Discussion
Taken together the empirical findings in this chapter warrant the conclusion that
people display an overuse of name letters in written texts. The enhanced use of own
name letters was obtained in scientific texts (Study 2.1), in informal stories produced in
the lab (Study 2.2), and in the generation of positive words (Study 2.3). Study 2.3
showed, as expected, that the overuse of own name letters was confined to words with
a positive valence while own letters were underused in negatively valenced words. So far,
these three studies are the only studies that demonstrated preferential name  letter use
in written language production.
It is interesting to ponder on the underlying mechanism behind these observed
effects. Research demonstrated that people show an unconscious bias for positive
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self-relevant memories (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) and this bias might also affect the
memory for (words with) name letters. It is possible that people selectively remember
words containing name letters. This memory bias might lead to the bias in letter
production that we found in the present research. 
In Study 2.3 however, we found that the name letter production bias is restricted
to positive words. People only use more name letters in positive words and they avoid
name letters in negative words. The fact that word valence is a strong moderator of name
letter use must be taken into account in the explanation for these phenomena. It is
conceivable that word selection is subject to an automatic implicit categorization process.
Positive words – or words that one prefers to relate to the self – tend to be preferentially
sampled from the stock containing name letter words. Conversely, negative words –
preferentially non-me related – may be preferentially selected from the set of words that
contain non-name letters. 
People may use such an unconscious selection process as a way of
self-enhancement. There is evidence from other domains of research that selection
processes may be used to support positive self-associations. For instance, Beggan
(1992) found that people display self-enhancing biases when making judgments about
objects they own. Cialdini and colleagues showed that people associate themselves with
successful others in order to feel good about themselves (BIRGing; Cialdini, Borden,
Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980). Social Identity
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) also states that making positive judgments about our own
group (and is therefore part of our identity) makes us feel better. Our name letters are part
of our identity and associating them with positive stimuli (i.e., positive words) makes
people feel good about themselves. So the preferential overproduction of name letters in
positive valenced words can be construed as evidence for an unconscious
self-enhancement strategy.
No relation was found between implicit self-esteem and the strength of
preference for name letter usage in texts. Possible explanations for the absence of this
relation are given in Chapter 5, the general discussion.
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ndeed, a large body of research has shown that name letter preferences may affect
all kinds of decisions, ranging from everyday consumer choices to major life
decisions (Brendl et al., 2005; Pelham, Carvallo, et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2004;
Pelham et al., 2002). For instance, in one of the studies of Brendl and colleagues
(2005) the names of tea packages were manipulated in such a way that the brand name
of the tea either started with the first three letters of the participant’s first name (e.g., ‘Mar’
for Martijn) or with three non-name letters (e.g., ‘Fes’). When asked to take one of the tea
packages home, participants were more likely to choose the tea with a brand name
containing their name letters (e.g., ‘Maredsous’). Furthermore, Pelham et al. (2002)
showed in a series of studies that ostensibly irrelevant symbols like name letters or
birthday numbers may implicitly influence major life decisions. These studies revealed
that name letter preferences may influence to which place or street people move (e.g.,
Karen lives in Katendrecht on Kannerweg), which jobs they choose (e.g., Edward
becomes an editor) and even whom they are going to marry (e.g., Esmée marries
Esmond). To sum up, implicit egotism seems to affect various preferences and
(important) decisions. 
PROCESSES UNDERLYING IMPLICIT EGOTISM EFFECTS
The term implicit egotism refers to the effect that people’s positive associations
about themselves spill over to their evaluations of self-relevant objects. Effects of implicit
egotism have been obtained for various self-relevant objects and symbols. For example,
several studies have shown that people particularly like their own name letters (Nuttin,
1987). Furthermore, people seem to fancy their own birthday numbers (Jones et al.,
2004; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Pelham et al., 2002; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van
Knippenberg, 2001). 
Recently, scholars have focused on the processes that are proposed to
underlie implicit egotism effects. For example, Brendl et al. (2005) showed effects of
name letter branding when participants focused on their feelings, but not when they
focused on their reasons for choosing the brands (see also Koole et al. 2001). These
results suggest that intuitive responding facilitates implicit egotism effects. Another issue
concerns the implicitness of the egotism effects. Some effects that were described above
may actually have involved explicit rather than implicit processes. For instance, when
Jack is about to decide to move to Jacksonville, he may very well be aware of the name
resemblance. In one of their experiments, Jones et al. (2004) illustrated the
nonconscious nature of implicit egotism effects by subliminally linking a number (e.g., 16)
to the participant’s first name. In a subsequent phase of the experiment, the (now)
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self-relevant number or a control number was placed on a woman’s jersey. Results
showed that (male) participants were more attracted to the woman when the number that
was displayed on her jersey had been nonconsciously coupled with the self. Together, by
illustrating the intuitive and nonconscious nature of implicit egotism, these studies
advanced our understanding of processes underlying this phenomenon.
However, to our view one of the most crucial variables related to the theory of
implicit egotism has, as yet, to be systematically studied and empirically demonstrated.
This variable concerns the level of positivity associated with the self. Most theorists argue
that implicit egotism is derived from positive affect related to the self. For example,
Pelham and colleagues (2002) noted that “people’s automatic associations about
themselves may influence their feelings about almost anything that people associate with
the self” (p. 470). Then, given the centrality of the concept of positivity of
self-associations to the theory of implicit egotism, an important next step would be to test
whether implicit egotism effects are moderated by individual differences in levels of
positive self-associations. The present two studies aimed to provide such a test by linking
implicit egotism effects to individual differences in implicit self-esteem. More specifically,
we aimed to show that preferences for objects referring to the self are observed for
individuals with high implicit self-esteem, but not for individuals with neutral or low
self-esteem. 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SELF
In line with recent treatments, we define implicit self-esteem as an attitudinal
construct (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). That is, consistent with
general ideas concerning the nature of attitudes, implicit self-esteem can be
conceptualized as the association between the self and its (positive or negative)
evaluation. In support of this notion, Dijksterhuis (2004) showed that subliminally linking
self-related words (like I or me) with positive words (e.g., good, great) enhances scores
on several implicit self-esteem measures. Thus, if a person is confronted with a stimulus
or an object that activates the self, the positive or negative evaluation towards the self
may become automatically activated and bias subsequent judgments towards that
stimulus or object (cf. Fazio, 1990, 2001). This approach also has consequences for
understanding implicit measures of self-esteem. 
In their influential paper, Bosson et al. (2000) examined several measures of
implicit self-esteem. One striking result of their study concerned the weaknesses of the
statistical properties (e.g., test-retest reliability) of various implicit self-esteem measures.
However, one of the implicit self-esteem measures with desirable properties is the name
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letter effect (Nuttin, 1985). Therefore, we use the name letter measure in this paper to
measure participants’ implicit self-esteem. 
Koole and Pelham (2003) suggest that the strength of the name letter effect
constitutes a valid measure of implicit self-esteem. This idea is corroborated by several
findings. Firstly, people strongly identify with their names (e.g., Bugental & Zelen, 1950;
Dion, 1983), and name letters are therefore strongly related to the self. Thus, while
assessing the name letter effect, participants evaluate self-relevant stimuli. Furthermore,
these evaluations of name letters can be considered implicit, because people have no
awareness of their preferences for their own name letters (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Koole,
Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Nuttin, 1985; Wentura et al., 2005).
Strong evidence for the idea that name letters are automatically positively evaluated was
provided by Wentura and colleagues (2005). Using an affective priming paradigm, they
showed that subliminal primes of participants’ initials facilitated responses to positive
words and inhibited responses to negative words. Furthermore, Dijksterhuis (2004)
showed that nonconsciously enhancing implicit self-esteem by means of evaluative
conditioning, can boost name letter evaluations. A final reason for the use of the name
letter effect as a measure of implicit self-esteem is that the name letter effect cannot be
accounted for by a simple mere exposure explanation (Jones et al., 2002; see also
Chapter 1). 
In sum, considering these observations it seems reasonable to assume that the
name letter effect is a valid and reliable indicator of the level of positivity that is
associated with the self. In addition, Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (2007) also
successfully used this method to measure implicit self-esteem for testing its influence on
ownership effects. We expect that this measure may also predict other effects of implicit
egotism, such as people’s liking for products with brand names starting with their name
letters. In contrast, explicit measures of self-esteem are less likely to reliably tap the level
of positivity that is associated with the self, because responses are likely to be distorted
as a result of all kinds of self-serving biases. When it comes to self-attitudes, people are
motivated to alter their automatically activated attitude, and report a different (e.g., more
positive) one. Indeed, the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem measures is
generally low (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; Koole et al., 2001). Because of these
dissociations between implicit and explicit measures, we do expect implicit, but not
explicit, self-esteem measures to predict implicit egotism effects. 
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THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research aimed to show that implicit self-esteem moderates
implicit egotism effects. We expect that low implicit self-esteem individuals evaluate
self-relevant objects in a less positive manner than high implicit self-esteem individuals.
Self-relevance was manipulated by means of two distinct procedures. In Study 3.1
objects were made self-relevant by using the first two letters of participants’ names, in
Study 3.2 birthday numbers were added to these name letters to activate the self. Implicit
egotism effects were investigated by measuring the influence of the selfrelevance
manipulation on evaluations of products, namely a bicycle in Study 3.1 and a
DVD-player in Study 3.2. 
Study 3.1
Method
Overview
Participants were exposed to an advertisement of a bicycle. Within the
self-relevance condition, the name of the bike started with the first two letters of the
participant’s first name. Within the control condition the bike’s name started with two
non-name letters. Subsequently, participants evaluated the bike. Afterwards, implicit
self-esteem was measured by the name letter effect. 
Participants and Design
Participants were 32 undergraduates of Radboud University Nijmegen,
receiving € 1 for their participation. In order to assure that the bike was relevant for
everybody, only participants were included who were riding a bike on a regular basis. As
a consequence the data of one participant were excluded from the analyses. 
The study consisted of a 2 (Self-reference: self-relevant vs. control) X Implicit
Self-esteem between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
two self-reference conditions. Implicit self-esteem was used as a continuous factor. 
Procedure
Participants registered by writing their name on a registration form.
Subsequently, the experimenter surreptitiously entered the participant’s name in the
computer and started the program. Participants were seated behind the computer and
were told that they took part in a study on consumer behavior. All instructions were
presented via the computer screen.
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Participants viewed an advertisement of a bicycle (see Figure 1), containing
some information about the bike, a picture of it, and the name of the bike. Self-reference
of the bike was manipulated by altering the first letters of the brand name of the bike
(Brendl et al., 2005). In the self-relevant condition, the name of the bike started with the
first two letters of the participant’s first name. In the control condition, the name of the bike
started with two letters that were not part of the participant’s first or last name. The stem
of the bike’s name was identical for both conditions, namely “-itraco”. This name could
easily be combined with all the possible (Dutch) combinations of first two letters, without
creating any unpronounceable names. So, if a participant’s name was Harrie Smeets, the
name of the bike in the self-relevant condition would be Haitraco and in the other
condition, this would for example be Zuitraco.
Figure 1: The ad of the bicycle
After reading the advertisement, participants responded to four different items
measuring the evaluation of the bike. The items included questions concerning the
quality and convenience of the bike. Furthermore, we included items with regard to the
intention to buy the bike and to recommend the bike to others. Participants provided their
answers on 7-point scales. The picture and name of the bike were displayed on the
screen during these questions. The four items were found to be internally consistent
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(α = .88). We computed general bike evaluation scores by averaging the score of the
items. 
After the product task, the level of implicit self-esteem was assessed using a
name letter measure, which was introduced as a study of intuitive judgments of simple
stimuli (Nuttin, 1985; see also Koole et al., 1999). Participants were asked to intuitively
evaluate letters of the alphabet as quickly as possible on a 5 point scale (1 = not at all
beautiful to 5 = very beautiful). The 26 letters of the alphabet were presented in random
order. The name letter effect was calculated using a procedure proposed by Kitayama
and Karasawa (1997). Firstly, we computed 26 norm evaluation scores, by calculating the
mean evaluation of each letter, only using the letter evaluations of people whose names
did not contain this letter. Then, for every letter of the participant’s name, norm
evaluation scores were subtracted from the participant’s evaluation score of the name
letters. The name letter effect is the average of these difference scores. 
After the letter evaluation part, participants were thanked, debriefed and paid.
None of the participants were able to guess the hypotheses being tested, nor were
participants aware of the presence of their name letters in the advertisement.
Results
Preliminary analyses
The name letter effect was replicated in this study, that is, the mean score
across participants was significantly above zero (M = .29, SD = .47), t(30) = 3.43, p < .01.
The strength of the name letter effect was not influenced by Self-reference condition,
t < 1, n.s.
Implicit self-esteem and implicit egotism
To test our hypothesis concerning the relation between self-esteem and implicit
egotism, the evaluation of the bike was regressed on Implicit Self-esteem (standardized
name letter effect scores), Self-reference (dummy coded, -1 = control condition, 1 =
self-relevant condition) and the Implicit Self-esteem X Self-reference interaction term.
This analysis revealed no significant main-effects (both t ‘s < 1). However, as predicted,
the Implicit Self-esteem X Self-reference interaction term was significantly related to bike
evaluation, Beta = .35, t(27) = 2.03, p < .05. Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991)
revealed that self-reference was marginal significantly related to evaluation scores for
high implicit self-esteem participants, Beta = .47, t(27)  = 1.89, p < .07, but not for low
implicit self-esteem participants, Beta = -.25, t(27) = -1.00, p > .30, n.s. Importantly,
implicit self-esteem was significantly related to evaluation scores within the self-relevant
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condition, Beta = .71, t(27) = 2.72, p < .01, but not within the control, Beta = .00, t(27) =
0.01, p > .99, n.s. So, the self-relevant bike was evaluated more positively by people high
in implicit self-esteem than people low in implicit self-esteem. In the control condition, we
did not find an effect of implicit self-esteem. Figure 2 shows the nature of the effects. 
Figure 2: The evaluation of the bike as a function of Self-esteem and Self-reference
Discussion
The results of the first experiment confirm our predictions. Evaluations of a
self-referring object were found to be more positive among high self-esteem individuals
compared to low self-esteem individuals. These effects are in line with the idea that the
degree of positivity associated with the self moderates the strength of implicit egotism
effects. 
Although the results of Study 3.1 are promising, there are some issues to be
solved. Are the results really related to self-esteem? One could argue that participants
who liked the first two letters of their name also like a product that starts with the same
two letters. Then, our results may be explained by the mere liking of letters, and has
nothing to do with self-esteem. In order to show that the results concern influences of
self-esteem rather than being a game of funny letters we conducted an additional
analysis. If our effects were due to the sheer liking of the first two letters of the bike’s
name, the evaluation of the first two letters of the name of the control bike should also be
correlated with the evaluation of that bike. However, these two variables were unrelated
within the control condition, r = .37, p > .20, n.s. Although this correlation is
non-significant, we conducted another additional analysis to provide a more stringent test
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to exclude this alternative explanation. 
As we posit that the first two letters of the name were solely used to cue
self-related processes in order to activate the self-attitude, the evaluation of these two
letters in itself should not be crucial with regard to the obtained effects. Therefore, we
again calculated the name letter score, but this time leaving out the evaluations of the first
two letters of the first name. This analysis revealed the same pattern of results as those
reported above, although the interaction term of Name letter (minus the first two letters)
evaluation x Self-reference is less strong. One should expect these effects to be a little
weaker, because two letters are discarded from the analyses. However, the pattern of
results is the same and confirms our hypothesis. This analysis again revealed no
significant main-effects (both t ‘s < 1). However, as predicted, the Name letter (minus the
first two letters) evaluation X Self-reference interaction term was marginal significantly
related to bike evaluation, Beta = .32, t(27) = 1.78, p < .08. Simple slope analyses (Aiken
& West, 1991) revealed that self-reference was marginal significantly related to
evaluation scores for high Name letter (minus the first two letters) evaluation participants,
Beta = .45, t(27) = 1.71, p < .10, but not for low Name letter (minus the first two letters)
evaluation participants, Beta = -.21, t(27) = -0.83, p > .40, n.s. Importantly, Name letter
(minus the first two letters) evaluation was significantly related to evaluation scores
within the self-relevant condition, Beta = .65, t(27) = 2.32, p < .03, but not within the
control condition, Beta = .00, t(27) = 0.01, p > .99, n.s. Together, these additional
analyses corroborate our conclusion that implicit self-esteem facilitates the liking of
objects that refer to the self. 
In Study 3.2 we aimed to replicate these findings, using a different product.
Moreover, we strengthened the self-relevance manipulation by using birthday-numbers in
addition to name letters as part of the product name. Finally, in Study 3.2 implicit
self-esteem was measured before participants were confronted with the product, and
measures of explicit self-esteem were included. 
Study 3.2
Method
Overview
During a preliminary session one week before the experimental session,
implicit and explicit self-esteem were assessed. In the experimental session, participants
were exposed to an advertisement of a DVD-player. In the self-reference condition, the
serial name of the DVD-player started with the first two letters of the first name of the
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participant. Furthermore, the name also included the participant’s birthday number. In the
control condition, the name was unrelated to the participant’s name or birthday number.
Subsequently, participants evaluated the DVD-player. 
Participants and Design
Participants were 78 undergraduate students of Radboud University Nijmegen,
who were paid € 2 for their participation. The study consisted of a 2 (Self-reference:
self-relevant vs. control) X Implicit Self-esteem between subjects design. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the self-reference conditions. Implicit self-esteem was
used as continuous independent factor.
Procedure
The procedure of Study 3.2 was almost identical to the one in Study 3.1.
However, instead of finishing the experiment with the name letter task, participants
started Study 3.2 with the implicit self-esteem measure, to make sure our self-reference
manipulation could not influence participants’ levels of implicit self-esteem. 
After this, they completed a Dutch version of the Rosenberg’s (1965) Trait
Self-esteem Scale (Holland, Meertens, & Van Vugt, 2002; Smeets & Holland, 2002), and
the Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-esteem Scale to measure explicit
self-esteem. The Trait Self-esteem scale consisted of 10 items, e.g., “In general I feel
good about myself”, (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). The State Self-esteem
Scale consisted of 20 items, e.g., “I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now”,
(1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). After completing this task participants made
an appointment for a second session and left the lab.
After a week, participants returned and continued the experiment with the
product evaluation task. The product evaluation task was basically the same as in Study
3.1, only this time the advertisement was about a DVD-player, and we added a number
to the product’s name (see Figure 3). In the self-relevance condition, the name of the
DVD-player consisted of the word “DVD”, followed by the two letters of the participant’s
first name and the participant’s birthday number. This birthday number was added to
make the self-relevance manipulation stronger. In the control condition, two letters that
were no part of the participant’s name and a two-digit number that was different from the
birthday number followed the stem of the name of the product “DVD”. For example,
consider a participant whose first name was Mariëlle, born on May 14, 1979. The name
of the DVD-player in the self-relevant condition would be DVD-Ma 14 and in the control
condition the name would for instance be DVD-Pu 30. 
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Figure 3 : The ad of the DVD-player
After reading the advertisement, subjects responded to four questions about the
DVD-player, while the picture and the name of the player were displayed on the screen
(e.g., “How do you like the design of the DVD-player? 1 = not attractive at all to 7 = very
attractive). The DVD evaluation score was calculated by the mean of the four evaluation
items (α = .82). Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed and paid. None of the
participants were able to guess our hypotheses, nor were they aware of the
self-relevance of the letters and/or numbers in the advertisement.
Results
Preliminary analyses
The name letter effect was again replicated, i.e., the mean score was above
zero (M = 0.40, SD = 1.11), t(77) = 3.17, p < .01. Neither the name letter effect, nor the
explicit self-esteem scales differed between the experimental conditions, t < 1.8, n.s.
Implicit self-esteem and implicit egotism
The evaluation score of the DVD-player was regressed on Implicit Self-esteem,
Self-reference and the Implicit Self-esteem X Self-reference interaction term. We found
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no main effects (both t’s < 1). However, the Implicit Self-esteem X Self-reference
interaction was significant, Beta = .41, t(74) = 2.46, p < .02. Simple slopes analyses
showed that self-reference was significantly related to the evaluation scores of the DVD
player among high implicit self-esteem participants, Beta = .42, t(74) = 2.57, p < .02, but
not among low implicit self-esteem participants, Beta = -.18, t(74) = -1.04, p > .30, n.s.
Within the control condition, implicit self-esteem was marginally significant related to the
evaluation of the DVD-player, Beta = -.38, t(74) = -1.94, p < .06. Within the
self-relevance condition, the relation with the evaluation scores did not reach
significance, Beta = .22, t(74) = 1.52, p < .13. The effects are shown in Figure 4.
Apparently, low self-esteem participants liked the control product somewhat more than
high self-esteem participants (p < .06). More importantly, high self-esteem people liked
the DVD-player more in the self-relevance than in the control condition (p < .02). 
Figure 4: The evaluation of the DVD-player as a function of Self-esteem and
Self-reference
Explicit self-esteem was also used in these analyses, that is, the same
regression analysis was performed as above with explicit self-esteem as predictor
variable instead of implicit self-esteem. No significant effects were obtained, all t‘s < 1.1,
n.s.
Again, we tested whether the results could be explained by sheer letter
evaluations. As in Study 3.1, the evaluation of the first two letters that were used in the
control product was unrelated to the evaluation of that product, r = .03, p > .80, n.s.
Furthermore, we tested whether the same results would be obtained if the implicit
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self-esteem was calculated leaving out the letters that were used in the self-relevant
DVD-player. Indeed, these alternative analyses did not alter the nature of our results. 
Discussion
The second study provided further evidence for the hypothesis that preferences
for self-related objects are moderated by level of implicit self-esteem. We found that high
self-esteem participants liked the product with a brand name starting with their own name
letters more than the control product. 
General Discussion
The present research investigated whether implicit egotism effects, namely
liking for self-relevant objects, are dependent on people’s implicit self-evaluations. Across
two studies we showed that implicit evaluations of the self indeed moderate implicit
egotism effects. Products were liked better by high self-esteem participants than low
self-esteem participants when the brand name of that product included name letters
(Study 3.1) or name letters and birthday numbers (Study 3.2). In other words, products
that referred to the self were liked better by individuals who have positive implicit self
associations. 
As we used name letters both to measure implicit self-esteem and to
manipulate self-reference of the product it is important to show that our findings are not
due to (trivial) letter evaluations, which have nothing to do with implicit egotism. As the
term already implies, implicit egotism specifically emphasizes the spilling over of positive
self-evaluations to things referring to the self, instead of the spilling over of positive
evaluations in general. Indeed, our analyses showed that the letter evaluations of the first
two letters of the control product were unrelated to the evaluation of the control product,
and leaving out the letters that were used in the advertisement in calculating the name
letter effect did not change the pattern of results. These findings show that it is not the
evaluation of letters in general that is driving our effects. Thus, the present results
provide evidence for the implicit egotism explanation that name letters function as cues
for self-relevant processing, as a result of which levels of implicit self-esteem may
influence the evaluation of products that refer to the self. 
With these findings, we have demonstrated that the level of positivity
associated with the self indeed explains implicit egotism effects, thereby confirming a
central aspect of implicit egotism literature, namely that implicit egotism is derived from
positive affect related to the self. Although lying at the core of implicit egotism theory,
systematic empirical tests of the role of implicit self-esteem have been lacking until
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recently. Gawronski et al. (2007) already demonstrated the crucial role of implicit
self-esteem in the mere ownership effect, by showing that ownership of an object only
leads to higher implicit liking for the object for high self-esteem people. Importantly, the
present two studies in this chapter show that the results are not confined to ownership
effects, but also work for evaluations of objects that are linked to the self by means of an
association between the brand name and one’s own name letters. Furthermore, we
obtained effects on explicit liking scales, whereas Gawronski et al. (2007) focused on
implicit liking effects. 
In this chapter we demonstrated that implicit self-esteem plays a moderating
role in the evaluation of self-relevant objects. This self-relevance was manipulated by
using the participants name letters or not. One could say that if these effects are as robust
as we argue, then these effects should also be found when using other self-reflexive
objects in which no name letters are involved. 
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TRADING THE SELF: IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM
MODERATES THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT
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uppose a friendly person comes up to you and gives you a pen. You think it
is great that you are now the owner of the pen. A few minutes later someone
else walks up to you and asks if she can buy your pen. For what price would
you sell it? Probably, you would want more money in return for this pen, than
you would have been willing to pay for it if you did not own it.
Research on the endowment effect suggests that people ascribe more
monetary value to an object once they own it and are requested to sell it (referred to as
the willingness to accept; WTA), compared to the money people want to spend for the
same object if they are not yet the owner (willingness to pay; WTP). Endowment effects
constitute an important issue in both economics and psychology and have been studied
in many different contexts, ranging from, e.g., markets for goose hunting permits (Bishop
& Heberlein, 1979) to markets for trading bottles of wine (Van Dijk & D. van Knippenberg,
1998). 
Despite the vast amount of empirical evidence for the endowment effect, the
exact mechanisms that underlie it are still a matter of debate. In the economic literature,
endowment effects are usually explained in terms of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky,
1984). Loss aversion refers to the psychological consequences of loss: the loss of an
object that you own outweighs the gain of acquiring the same object if you did not own it.
In other words: Losses loom larger than gains (Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, & Bilgin,
2007; Thaler, 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). This could explain why
people want more money for selling an owned product (WTA) compared to the amount
of money that they want to spend for buying the same product that is not owned (WTP).
However, in addition to loss aversion, researchers have argued that the
endowment effects may be influenced by a psychological process referred to as the mere
ownership effect (Ortona & Scacciati, 1992; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1996; Hoorens,
Remmers, & van de Riet, 1999). Research on the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992)
showed that people evaluate objects more favorably once they own these objects.
Considering that the endowment effect is related to selling an object that one owns
versus buying an object which one does not own, the mere ownership effect must be
highly relevant for the analysis of the endowment effect. However, empirical evidence for
linking the mere ownership to the endowment effect is scarce.
The only study that empirically addressed the role of mere ownership in
research on the endowment effect is the study of Hoorens et al. (1999). They
independently manipulated target (self versus another person) and type of transaction
(buying versus selling). Two main effects were obtained. Firstly, more money was
assigned to selling situations compared to buying situations, providing evidence for the
R S
S
C
h
ap
ter
 4
56
loss aversion effect. Secondly, more money was assigned when participants had to make
buying or selling decisions for themselves rather than for another (comparable)
individual. The latter result was interpreted as evidence for the role of ownership in the
endowment effect. However, it is not quite clear whether the studies of Hoorens and
colleagues (1999) also speak to other studies on the endowment effect, as in their
studies target, i.e., making a judgment for the self or for another person, was always
manipulated  within subjects. In other words, the salience of the self-other distinction may
have contributed to the bias in their studies and it is therefore not clear whether mere
ownership biases would also occur in situations in which no reference is made to
self-other differences.
In order to provide evidence for the role of ownership in the endowment effect,
we approached the idea from a quite different angle. In two studies we aim to show that
that endowment effects are based on mere ownership effects because both processes
depend on individual differences in implicit self-esteem. 
MERE OWNERSHIP EFFECTS AND POSITIVE SELF-ASSOCIATIONS
Research on the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992) showed that people
evaluate an object more favorably once they own it. Several studies revealed evidence
for the mere ownership effect. (Beggan, 1992; Belk, 1988; Heider, 1958; James,
1890/1950; Tuan, 1980). The mere ownership effect can be considered to be an
example of implicit egotism effects. Across various domains it has been demonstrated
that people’s positive self-associations may spill over to objects that are linked to the self,
such as name letters (Nuttin, 1987; Koole et al., 2000) or birthday numbers (Kitayama &
Karasawa, 1997). Consistent with these other demonstrations of implicit egotism effects,
once an object is merely owned it becomes linked to the self. As a consequence,
positive self-associations could enhance the evaluation of objects once these are owned. 
Importantly, this account of the mere ownership effect also implies that the
strength and the direction of the mere ownership effect depend on individual differences
in self-associations. That is, the mere ownership effect should be relatively strong among
individuals with positive self-associations, but weak, absent or even reversed for
individuals with negative self-associations. In other words, the mere ownership effect
depends on spill-over effects of self-evaluations, and therefore individuals will only like
owned objects if they like themselves, but not if they dislike themselves. In line with these
ideas, Gawronski et al. (2007), using reaction time measures, showed that evaluative
associations with regard to owned objects could be predicted by evaluative associations
concerning the self.
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Thus, one way to show that the endowment effect is partly based on the mere
ownership effect would be to demonstrate that the endowment effect is stronger for
individuals with positive self-associations compared to individuals with negative
self-associations. This idea has never been studied. Although Gawronski and colleagues
were able to show consistency effects of self-evaluations and owned object-evaluations,
the object evaluations were measured on an implicit level. However, the endowment
effect consists of the explicit assignment of monetary value to an object. 
The crucial question, then, is whether people derive their explicit evaluations
from implicit self-anchoring processes. Although correlations between implicit and
explicit evaluations have been reported across several issues, the absence of such
correlations is at least as common (see for an overview Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Therefore, while the link
between implicit self-esteem and implicit product evaluations is already empirically
established, the relationship between implicit self-esteem measures and explicit product
evaluations and explicit reports of monetary value still has to be demonstrated. 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In the present research we aim to show that the mere ownership effect
underlies the endowment effect by testing the hypothesis that the endowment effect will
be stronger among individuals with positive self-associations than among individuals
holding negative self-associations.
If mere ownership and, hence, differences in self-associations are important
variables in explaining the endowment effect, a first important step would be to
demonstrate differences between explicit evaluations of possessed versus
non-possessed objects as a function of implicit self-esteem. In Study 4.1, we studied the
effects of implicit self-esteem on object evaluations in two conditions. In the possession
condition we gave the object to the participant for a present, while in the control
condition we did not. Subsequently, we asked participants to explicitly evaluate the
object. We predicted that implicit self-esteem was related to object evaluations in the
possession condition, but not in the control condition. Study 4.2 followed up on this first
study, by directly testing the endowment effects as a function of differences in
self-esteem. In Study 4.2 we first measured implicit self-evaluations. One or two weeks
later, participants returned to the laboratory and did or did not receive a pen as a gift. In
the possession condition, participants were asked for how much money they were willing
to sell this pen. In the control condition, they were asked how much money they wanted
to pay for this pen. We expected that implicit self-esteem would affect the value of
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participants in the possession condition, but not in the control condition.
Study 4.1
Overview
In this study, a measure of implicit self-esteem was administered in a
preliminary session. In the experimental session, participants explicitly evaluated an
object (a pen) that was either given to them (possession condition), or not (control
condition). 
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 99 undergraduate students from Radboud University
Nijmegen, who were paid € 3, -. The study consisted of a 2 (Ownership: Possession vs.
control) X Implicit Self-esteem between-subjects design. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two Ownership conditions. Implicit self-esteem was used as a
continuous factor. The dependent variable was the evaluation of the pen.
Procedure
This study consisted of two parts, a pre-measure and an experimental session
on a computer. In the pre-measure we used a paper-and-pencil version of the name
letter measure, in which participants had to indicate as quickly as possible how attractive
they found each letter of the alphabet presented in random order. They could do so on a
9 point scale ranging from 1 = not beautiful at all to 9 = very beautiful. The method for
calculating the name letter effect was adapted from Kitayama and Karasawa (1997).
Generally speaking, participants preferred name letters above non-name letters (Mdif =
0.30, SD = 0.90), t(98) = 3.35, p < .01. In the experiment however, we were interested
whether difference in this self-esteem measure could predict object evaluations.
After the name letter measure, participants filled in the Rosenberg Trait
Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), which consisted of 10 items. After finishing the
latter task, participants made an appointment with the experimenter for the second
session.
Approximately one week later, participants returned to the laboratory where they
were seated in an individual cubicle behind a computer. The experimenter told them that
further instructions would be presented on the computer screen. Participants started with
a product evaluation task. The procedure of this task was adapted from Beggan (1992).
Next to the computer, we placed a small box containing three products; a pen, a pencil
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sharper, and a note block (see Figure 5). Participants were asked to take these products
out of the box and place them in front of them on the table. Because earlier studies
showed substantial differences in price estimates between participants (see Beggan,
1992), we told the participants that all three products had a value between € 0.99 and
€ 1.09, to prevent the participants’ price estimates to influence their product evaluations. 
Figure 5: The products that were to be evaluated
The participants in the possession condition were told that they received one of
the three products as a present in gratitude for their participation in the experiment. The
computer randomly determined the product they received. In fact this gift product was
always the pen. After this, participants continued with the evaluation part. Participants in
the control condition were not told anything about receiving a gift and continued with the
product evaluation directly after taking the products from the box.
The product evaluation part consisted of six questions; two questions about
each of the three products. These questions were “How do you evaluate the pen/pencil
sharper/note block? (1 = very negatively to 9 = very positively) and “How attractive do you
find the pen/pencil sharper/note block?” (1 = very unattractive to 9 = very attractive). The
answers to the two questions asked about the pen were averaged in order to get a mean
evaluation score of the pen (α = .80). After these six questions, participants were asked
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to put the products back into the box, except for the participants in the possession
condition who were allowed to keep the pen. After the product evaluation task, some
demographic variables were measured. Finally, participants were thanked, paid and
debriefed. None of the subjects reported to have guessed the hypothesis.
Results
To test the effects of implicit self-esteem and ownership of the pen, we
conducted a regression analysis on the evaluation of the pen, using Implicit self-esteem,
Ownership and the interaction term Implicit self-esteem X Ownership as predictors of the
evaluation of the pen. We found a main effect of implicit self-esteem, Beta = .65, t(96) =
2.15, p < .03, such that the higher scores on implicit self-esteem the more positive the
evaluations of the objects. The interaction implicit self-esteem X ownership was
marginally significant, Beta = -.41, t(96) = -1.89, p < .06. We conducted simple slope
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) and found that there was an effect of implicit self-esteem
on the evaluation of the pen in the Possession condition, Beta = .27, t(96) = 2.07, p < .04,
but not in the Control condition, Beta = -.12, t(96) = -0.74, p > .46, n.s. In the possession
condition people high in implicit self-esteem liked the pen better than people low in
implicit self-esteem. In the control condition there were no differences between the
evaluations of the pen of high and low implicit self-esteem participants, t < 1. These
results are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Evaluation of the pen as a function of Self-esteem and Ownership
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It should be noted that the results were identical when we used difference
scores, i.e., the evaluation of the pen contrasted with the evaluation scores of the two
other products. Similar analyses using explicit self-esteem did not reveal any significant
effect (all t’s < 1).
Discussion
As expected, we found that people high in implicit self-esteem evaluated the pen
when owned more positively than the same pen when they did not own it. People low in
implicit self-esteem did not show this effect. Thus, the level of implicit self-esteem
moderates the mere ownership effect. People high in implicit self-esteem have strong
positive self-associations and this positivity spills over to other self-related objects, such
as their possessions. For people low in implicit self-esteem, there is nothing positive to
spill over. They have negative self-associations and these self-associations do not spill
over to self-associated objects like possessions.
Encouraged by the results of Study 4.1 we continued to study the effects of
implicit self-esteem on the endowment effect in Study 4.2. If the endowment effect can be
partly explained by the mere ownership effect, we would expect that implicit self-esteem
would also moderate the endowment effect. 
Study 4.2
Overview
In this study, we investigated the role of implicit self-esteem in the endowment
effect. Implicit self-esteem was measured by what may be called a name letter version of
the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Farnham et al., 1999). The object to be valued in this
study was a pen that was either given to participants (who could keep it), or not. This way,
we investigated the role of implicit self-esteem with regard to the endowment effect.  
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 38 undergraduate students of Radboud University Nijmegen,
who were paid € 3, -. The study consisted of a 2 (Ownership: Possession vs. control) X
Implicit Self-esteem between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the two Ownership conditions. Implicit self-esteem was used as a continuous
factor. The dependent variable was the price allocated to the pen. 
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Procedure
The procedure of Study 4.2 was approximately the same as the procedure of
Study 4.1. Again, this study consisted of two sessions. In a preliminary session we
measured implicit self-esteem by using an adapted version of the self-esteem IAT
(Farnham et al., 1999), which we refer to as the name-letter IAT. In this name letter IAT
one categorization concerned positive vs. negative words and the other categorization
concerned the name letters vs. non-name letters of the participant. The IAT comprised 5
blocks, in which participants were asked to categorize stimuli as accurately and as fast
as possible. In the first block, participants were asked to categorize positive and
negative words using a right- and left- hand key on the keyboard respectively. In the
second block, they were asked to categorize the presented letters as ‘own name letters’
or ‘non own name letters’ using the same keys. In the third block, these tasks were
combined, so that positive words and name letters should engender the same response
(on the left key) and negative words and non name letters should engender the same
response (on the right key). In the fourth block participants again only had to categorize
positive and negative words but now, compared to the first block, the keys for the
positive and negative words were reversed. In the final fifth block, the two categorization
tasks were combined again, but now the positive response was combined with the non
name letter response and the negative response was combined with the name letter
response. 
The name letter IAT scores were calculated after removing reaction times of
incorrect responses. The IAT score is then the difference between the mean reaction time
of (the ‘incongruent’) block 5 and the mean reaction time of (the ‘congruent’) block 3. This
way, the name letter IAT score represents the ease of combining name letters
(self-symbols) with positive things compared to combining them with negative things
(relative to the same comparison for non name letters). The higher this score, the higher
the participant’s implicit self-esteem. 
At the end of part one, participants made an appointment with the experimenter for  part
two.
Approximately one week later, participants returned to the laboratory where they
were seated in an individual cubicle behind a computer. The experimenter told them that
further instructions would be presented on the computer screen. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two Ownership conditions and started
with a product pricing task. Like in Study 4.1, next to the computer we placed a small box
containing the three products; a pen, a pencil sharper, and a note block. Participants were
asked to take the products out of the box and place them in front of them on the table.
Nothing was mentioned about the product prices, because in this experiment, we were
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interested in the prices participants would allocate to the products as the main dependent
variable. 
The participants in the possess condition were told that they received one of the
three products as a present for their participation in the experiment. The computer
determined randomly which product they received. As in Study 4.1, this gift product was
always the pen. After looking at the products, participants were asked to put the products
back in the box, except that the participants who had just received the pen as a gift were
allowed to keep it. Participants in the control condition were not told anything about
receiving a gift and immediately continued with the next part of the experiment, after
putting all three products back in the box.
After an unrelated 5 minutes filler task, participants were asked to allocate an
amount of money to the pen. Participants in the possession condition were asked to
indicate the price for which there were prepared to sell the pen (WTA). Participants in the
control condition, who did not receive the pen as a gift, were asked to indicate the price
they were prepared to pay for the pen (WTP). Finally, participants were thanked, paid and
debriefed. None of the subjects reported to have guessed the hypothesis.
Results
Preliminary analyses
We obtained a significant name letter IAT-effect (Mdif = 0.29, SD = 0.29), t(37) =
6.04, p < .01, suggesting that, on average, the participants’ implicit name letter
evaluations were positive, specifically more positive than non-name letter evaluations.
Implicit egotism and evaluation of the pen
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a regression analysis on the price that
participants allocated to the pen, using Implicit self-esteem, Ownership and the
interaction term Implicit self-esteem X Ownership as predictors of the price of the pen.
Ownership was coded as a dummy variable, with value –1 for the control condition and
1 for the possession condition. We found a significant main effect of implicit self-esteem
on the price of the pen, Beta = .39, t(35) = 1.88, p < .04, indicating that people high in
implicit self-esteem found the pen more valuable. In line with our predictions, the
interaction between implicit self-esteem and ownership was also significant, Beta = .60,
t(35) = 2.00, p < .05. Simple slopes analyses revealed a marginal significant effect of
ownership for people high in implicit self-esteem, Beta = .47, t(35) = 1.95, p < .06, but not
for people low in implicit self-esteem. So people with positive self-associations estimated
the monetary value of the pen higher when they possessed it (WTA) than when they did
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not possess (WTP) the pen. There was no such effect for people low in implicit
self-esteem. Additionally, we found an effect of level of implicit self-esteem in the
possession condition, Beta = .64, t(35) = 2.14, p < .04, but not in the control condition,
Beta = -.07, t(35) = -0.38, p > .80, n.s., indicating that when participants could keep the
pen (WTA), participants high in implicit self-esteem allocated a higher monetary value to
the pen than did low self-esteem participants. These results are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Allocated price to the pen as a function of Self-esteem and Ownership
Again, there were no effects of explicit self-esteem on the price that participants
allocated to the pen (all t’s < 1). 
Discussion
As expected, we found that people with high implicit self-esteem allocated a
higher price to a pen they owned than to the same pen when they did not own it. People
low in implicit self-esteem did not allocate a higher price to the pen when they owned it.
So the endowment effect is moderated by differences in self-associations as indicated by
our implicit self-esteem measure. In line with previous research on the endowment effect,
WTA exceeded WTP. Importantly however, this effect was only obtained among
individuals with positive self-associations. No differences between the WTA and the WTP
were observed among people scoring low on our implicit self-esteem measure.
General Discussion
The goal of the present study was to demonstrate empirically that the mere
ownership effect may partly underlie endowment effects. The core idea was to show that
individual differences in the level of positive self-associations would be related to explicit
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statements concerning the monetary value of an owned object. As a first step, the results
of Study 4.1 showed that explicit evaluations of owned objects were predicted by implicit
self-esteem. Study 4.2 more directly showed the predicted effects. The endowment
effect, i.e., the difference in WTA and WTP, became more pronounced with increasing
positivity of self-associations in our participants. In other words, when selling an object
they owned high self-esteem participants ascribed more monetary value to it compared
to when buying the same object when they did not own it. This difference was not
obtained among low self-esteem participants. 
In line with contemporary accounts concerning the relation between implicit and
explicit attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2009) the
present research provides another case of consistency between implicit and explicit
evaluations. In other words, participants in our study used their automatic affective
reactions as a basis for their explicit evaluations and explicit statements regarding the
monetary value of objects. As we mentioned in the introduction, in various domains
discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations have been reported frequently.
Sometimes people are motivated and able to reject affective reactions as a basis for an
evaluative judgment. For example, it has been frequently shown that white participants
show negative implicit attitudes towards African Americans while expressing positive
attitudes on the explicit level. Also, implicit measures for self-esteem are often unrelated
to explicit measures of self-esteem. In both these cases participants reject their implicit
affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgment and use explicit beliefs as a basis
for their judgment (e.g., “I should not be negative about black people”, “It is good to have
positive self-regards”). However, in the present studies participants were not aware of the
fact that their self-evaluation may spill over to the product they had to evaluate, and
therefore they were less likely and less able to correct for their automatic affective
reactions.  
Our results may seem at odds with research by Beggan (1992) showing that
mere ownership effects particularly arise after individuals were provided with failure
feedback. In such cases people use the positive evaluation of owned objects as a
strategy to self-enhance and maintain a positive sense of self. In our study though, we
obtained the mere ownership effect and, by consequence, the endowment effect only for
people high in implicit self-esteem. We argue that, with regard to motivational
implications, a distinction should be made between the dynamics of failure feedback and
the way in which implicit self-esteem generally affects self-related objects. Failure
feedback may instigate a temporary motivation for self-enhancement, resulting in
enhanced ownership effects, independent of implicit self-esteem. 
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Conversely, high implicit self-esteem may predominantly influence ownership
processes due to the spill-over effect of positive self-associations in situations in which
self-esteem is not at stake, that is, when participants are not preoccupied with their
self-esteem. Note that such self-esteem-innocuous situations were also used in Studies
3.1 and 3.2 of the current dissertation. In line with the current findings, these previous
data showed a correlation between implicit self-esteem and evaluations of objects that
were linked to the self. Of course, it would be interesting to test ownership effects as a
function of both failure feedback and individual differences in implicit self-esteem. It may
be worthwhile to study these issues in future research.
The current study provides new and convincing evidence for the crucial role of
psychological processes in the endowment effect. Differences in the allocation of
monetary value as a function of selling and buying can be partly related to loss aversion
in selling. However, since selling always implies that you assign value to something you
possess, self-evaluation processes come into play. Our research shows that people
differ in their appreciation of the things they own. Their implicit self-esteem spills over to
the things they possess. 
So, when you evaluate your possessions, the basic rule is that you have to love
yourself – at least at an implicit level – before you can really appreciate what you own.
And if you do, chances are you will not sell it cheaply. 
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he main aim of this dissertation was to investigate the moderating role of
self-esteem in implicit egotism effects. In this final chapter, we will review our
findings and discuss how they shed a new light on implicit egotism effects.
After discussing the main findings of the empirical chapters, some limitations
will be addressed, and some directions for future research will be suggested.
THE MODERATING ROLE OF IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM IN IMPLICIT
EGOTISM
The central goal of this dissertation was to learn more about the processes
underlying implicit egotism by studying implicit egotism as a function of individual
differences in implicit self-esteem. Based on the idea that implicit egotism results from the
spill-over of positive self-associations to self-related objects, we hypothesized that
implicit egotism effects would only be obtained for individuals with positive
self-associations and not for individuals with neutral or negative self-associations. In
other words, the central hypothesis we tested was that people with high implicit
self-esteem show implicit egotism to a greater extent than people with low implicit
self-esteem. 
In line with this general hypothesis, the results described in Chapters 3 and 4
showed that implicit self-esteem indeed moderates implicit egotism. In Chapter 3 it was
shown that individual differences in self-esteem predict evaluations of objects referring to
the self. In line with earlier studies on implicit egotism effects in the domain of
name-branding (see e.g., Brendl et al., 2005), self-reference of objects was manipulated
by including the first two name letters of the participant in the brand name of an object
(i.e., a bike, Study 3.1) or by including the first two letters of the name of the participant
and their birthday number in the name of the product (i.e., a DVD-player, Study 3.2). Both
these studies revealed more positive evaluations of objects referring to the self among
high self-esteem individuals compared to low self-esteem individuals. No relation was
found between self-esteem and the evaluation of objects that were not related to the self. 
In Chapter 4 we further investigated the role of implicit self-esteem in implicit
egotism by building on previous research on the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992).
Beggan argued that the mere ownership of an object increases the evaluation of that
object because through ownership the object becomes part of the self. Going beyond this
previous work, and in line with the general hypothesis of this dissertation, we predicted
that owning an object would only result in positive evaluations of that object if the owner
holds positive self-associations and not if the owner’s self-associations are negative. This
idea was tested in the two studies reported in Chapter 4. In both studies participants were
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or were not given a pen. In agreement with the general hypothesis, the data showed that
when they owned the pen, participants with high self-esteem evaluated the pen more
positively (Study 4.1) and assigned more monetary value to it (Study 4.2) than low
self-esteem participants. No relation between product evaluation and self-esteem was
obtained in a control condition in which the pen was not owned. 
Taken together these four studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4 provide strong
evidence for our hypothesis that implicit egotism effects are moderated by implicit
self-esteem. Thus, our findings corroborate the idea that positive self-esteem underlies
implicit egotism effects, at least as far as implicit egotism is expressed in the enhanced
evaluation of objects one owns (Chapter 4) or objects bearing relevant self-symbols
(Chapter 3). As Pelham and colleagues (2002) theorized in their paper on the
consequences of name-letter preferences for major life decisions, “people’s automatic
associations about themselves may influence their feelings about almost anything that
people associate with the self” (p. 470). It is worth noting that this basic idea concerning
implicit egotism effects was actually never empirically tested (but see Gawronski et al.,
2007). The studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4 are fully in line with the idea that
positive self-associations spill over to self-related objects. If people have positive
self-associations they tend to evaluate self-related objects more positively than when
objects are not self-related. However, if people lack positive self-associations, such
implicit egotism effects are not obtained. Irrespective of the way in which a link is
established between the self and an object (e.g., through name letters or ownership),
such self-reference suffices to elicit spill-over effects of the attitude towards the self onto
these objects. 
In contrast to the findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4, the results of the
studies described in Chapter 2 showed no evidence for a correlation between implicit
self-esteem and the use of name letters in written language production. Across three
studies we provided evidence for an ‘implicit egotism’ effect entailing that individuals use
their own name letters in written text more frequently than they use the letters not
included in their name. Note that in Study 2.2 and 2.3 implicit self-esteem was measured,
but the data did not show any moderation of the overuse of name letters by implicit
self-esteem. Thus irrespective of individual differences in self-esteem, individuals
produce texts that contain more name-letters than you would expect on the basis of
chance. Importantly, Study 2.3 revealed that participants used more name letters in
positive valenced words, and not in negative valenced words, but again this effect was
obtained irrespective of the participants’ implicit self-esteem. 
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Why were the implicit egotism effects in language production reported in
Chapter 2 independent of differences in implicit self-esteem? Although the data in this
dissertation do not allow to directly test hypotheses concerning the conditions under
which moderation of implicit egotism by implicit self-esteem does or does not occur (i.e.,
hypotheses concerning the moderation of self-esteem moderation), it is worthwhile to
ponder on some possible explanations. 
One possibility that should be mentioned for the sake of completeness is that
the measures of self-esteem used in Chapter 2 (Study 2.2 and 2.3), i.e., the name letter
effect, was not reliable or valid. This is not a very plausible explanation since we
successfully used the same measure in the other empirical studies. Nevertheless, null
effects should always be treated with caution.
On a theoretical level, it is important to note that there are a few potentially
crucial differences in the type of processes studied in Chapter 2 versus those studied in
Chapters 3 and 4. While the processes studied in Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with
explicit evaluations of and preferences for objects, the language production processes
studied in Chapter 2 do not deal with explicit preferences. Language production
processes as studied in Chapter 2 may be characterized as largely automatic. Although
the content of what people say or write may be intentional and strategic, the selection of
words to compose an utterance seems to unfold in a fairly quick and automatic way (see
e.g., Levelt, 1989). Thus, although the possibility definitely cannot be ruled out
completely, it is unlikely that the words one uses when writing a text are online selected
partly on the basis of the letters they contain. In contrast, the processes studied in
Chapter 4 were more reflective in nature. Although, associative processes influence
decisions and evaluations, participants did reflect on their evaluations since they were
asked to explicitly evaluate the objects. In a nutshell, the latter is a slower process and
contains more deliberations directed at object preference than the former. When
discussing possible explanations for the difference in self-esteem moderation, it may also
be of interest to focus on the difference between using positive things (e.g., positive
self-related words or other positive self-related symbols) and allocating value to things as
a function of possessing them. The question then is, how the difference in degree of
explicitness and the difference between preference and usage can explain the difference
in self-esteem moderation.
Considering these preliminary explorations concerning differences in process,
three tentative theoretical explanations may be put forward. First, spontaneously using
objects (e.g., words) may differ from explicitly evaluating objects in their implications for
self-enhancement. When using objects, their positive self-reflective nature (e.g., positive
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words with name letters in them) may elicit their preferential and repeated use outside of
the awareness of the user precisely because of their potential self-enhancing
implications. Thus construed, preferential use of positive words containing name letters
would constitute a spontaneous self-serving mechanism, which seems consistent with
some other self-enhancing strategies. Cialdini and colleagues showed that people
associate themselves with successful groups in order to feel good about themselves by,
e.g., using the term “we” (instead of “they”) or to wear club symbols (or not) when their
team had won (compared to lost) (Cialdini et al., 1976; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980). In
a similar vein, the preferential overuse of positive valenced words containing name
letters can be construed as an unconscious self-enhancement strategy.
Although admittedly highly speculative, the overuse of positive name letter
words could thus be construed as a stealthy and unconscious form of propaganda in
which one’s positive self-image is enhanced by repeated association of the self with
positive words with a high name letter proportion. The repeated use of these positive
name letter words would not only render the self but also own name letters more
positive by mere association with positive words. Since both people high in implicit
self-esteem and people low in implicit self-esteem engage in self-enhancement
strategies, differences in self-enhancement on the basis of variations in self-esteem
would not be expected (or may even be reversed assuming that threatened self-esteem
would require self-esteem repair). It follows from this reasoning that implicit self-esteem
would not have to moderate the overproduction of own name letter words in written texts.
However, as we noted above, it seems highly unlikely that the words we use in
spontaneous language productions are partly selected on the basis of the letters they
contain. Therefore, this intriguing and highly speculative explanation may not be the most
realistic one.
A second -and probably somewhat more plausible- explanation for the absence
of self-esteem moderation in the overuse of name letters in language production is based
on the idea that the relationship between name letter word use and self-esteem may have
existed at the time one learned to read and write, but the two processes became
dissociated over time. Children learning the alphabet -and even some time before they
come to know the entire alphabet- seem to have a fascination for their own name letters,
particularly for the initial of their first name. They may already recognize their first name
initial at an early age (as demonstrated, e.g., by shouting ‘that’s my letter’ when spotting
it) and later they may like to play around with their name letters and may even
unconsciously preferentially use positive words containing name letters. Although we do
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not even have any anecdotic evidence supporting this idea, it is possible that if we were
paying attention we might overhear Susie mumbling ‘super’ or Collin calling something
‘cool’ whenever they felt particularly good about something. At this early stage of learning
the alphabet and learning to read and write, the relationship between implicit self-esteem
(i.e., feeling good about oneself) and preferential name letter use may have been
established. As a consequence, for high self-esteem children these name-letter words
become more accessible. Accessibility of words is an important determinant of word
selection in language production. So when these words (i.e., positive words containing
name-letters) become more accessible, the subsequent use of these words further
enhances their accessibility which may over time create stable differential accessibility of
positive name letter words compared to other words. This way, at a relatively early age,
long lasting effects on word accessibility may have been established that may have
persisted irrespective of further developments of implicit self-esteem later in life. During
the lifespan, major and minor developments and events in someone’s life influence the
level of self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). Thus,
theself-esteem of some children may deteriorate while others’ may improve, resulting in
a dissociation between self-esteem and the relative overuse of positive name letter words
later in life. This may explain why we did not find self-esteem moderation of the overuse
of positive name letter words in the research reported in Chapter 2. It would be
interesting to test this idea in future research. For example, our argument would entail
that a relatively strong correlation between self-esteem and overuse of name letter words
may be obtained among young children. 
Finally, there is a third explanation in which the idea of a relationship between
self-esteem and word use is completely abandoned. It is conceivable that, particularly at
the time of language acquisition, words containing name letters sound more familiar and
are therefore used with more ease than words without name letters. Enhanced use will
lead to enhanced accessibility. Because positive words are generally being used more
frequently than negative words, the resulting differential accessibility effect of name letter
words versus non-name letter words may in the long run lead to the relative overuse of
positive name letter words. Although this seems a viable, ecological approach to explain
the phenomenon of overuse of positive name letter words, it would not explain the
underuse of name letters words in negative words.
With regard to the overuse of name letters in language production, the present
data are still lacking a solid theoretical foundation. It is up to future research to shed more
light on this intriguing phenomenon.
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UNDERSTANDING IMPLICIT EGOTISM EFFECTS
The present research aimed to elucidate the processes underlying implicit
egotism effects. A great number of studies on implicit egotism were based on archival
studies (e.g., Anseel & Duyck, 2008; Jones et al, 2004; Pelham, 2002). The present
research can be placed in the relatively small, but rapidly increasing (see e.g., Brendl et
al, 2005; Jones et al., 2004) category of studies that employed experimental techniques
to investigate implicit egotism effects. Using such an experimental approach, the present
studies circumvented possible problems that seem inherent to the archival approaches
(e.g., sampling biases, see Gallucci, 2003). 
We started out by testing the idea that positive self-associations are crucial in
understanding the enhanced evaluation of self-associated objects. In other words, we
expected that evaluation of the self would spill over to the evaluation of objects that are
or become linked to the self. Although this account is in line with the general argument of
Pelham and colleagues, an alternative mechanism has also been proposed in the
literature. Specifically, implicit egotism effects have been framed in terms of general
self-enhancement motives (e.g., Jones et al., 2004). Merely linking positive affect towards
self-related objects (e.g., name-letters or owned items) serves people to make them feel
better about themselves. In line with a self-enhancement account, several studies
showed that implicit egotism effects are stronger upon receiving failure feedback
(Beggan, 1992; Jones et al., 2004; Koole et al., 1999). People have an especially strong
need to feel good about themselves after an experience of failure and, therefore,
enhanced egotism effects will be obtained after failure. 
In contrast, the present results reported in Chapters 3 and 4 support the idea
that evaluative associations towards the self spill over to the evaluation or assigned value
of self-related objects. In other words, the implicit egotism effects involved can be best
understood in terms of “normal” attitudinal processes rather than motivational processes.
Associative processes (cf. self-anchoring, Gawronski et al., 2007) are assumed to play a
key role in implicit egotism effects. Indeed, in line with this assumption, we only obtained
a moderation of implicit egotism when using implicit measures of self-esteem (i.e., both
a name-letter measure and a self-esteem IAT). These implicit measures of self-esteem
tap into the evaluative associations of the self (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
Explicit measures of self-esteem however, failed to show any relationship with the
egotism phenomena examined in this dissertation. As explicit self-esteem measures rely
on propositional rather than associative processes, it is not surprising that they do not
moderate the implicit egotism effects studied in the present research. At the same time,
R SChapte
r
 5
75
explicit measures of self-esteem are also more likely to capture self-enhancement
motives. Therefore, the fact that we did not find moderation of implicit egotism by explicit
self-esteem further argues against self-enhancement strategies as a viable interpretation
of the egotism effects reported in Chapters 3 and 4 of the present dissertation.
However, we would like to emphasize that the present studies were designed to
show the moderating role of evaluative self-associations with regard to implicit egotism
effects and were clearly not designed to rule out self-enhancement explanations.
Nevertheless, a self-enhancement account provides a less parsimonious explanation for
the findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4, because these data may easily and
straightforwardly be explained in terms of evaluative self-associations. Earlier studies
providing evidence for self-enhancement in this domain could possibly also be explained
in terms of self-esteem differences. Clearly, failure feedback may strengthen
self-enhancement motives. At the same time, providing failure feedback can strengthen
the extent to which the self is activated, that is, failure can make the self more salient. As
a result, evaluative self-associations may play a more important role in decisions and
judgments after failure feedback such that individuals with positive self-associations may
then evaluate objects linked to the self more positively than individuals lacking these
positive self-associations. If, generally speaking, there are more individuals with positive
self-associations than with negative self-associations, it could be expected that on
average across individuals self-related objects become more attractive after failure
feedback. However, in order to further test these ideas, it would be interesting to study
the effects of failure feedback and other manipulations of self-activation on implicit
egotism as a function of individual differences in implicit self-esteem. This being said, we
cannot rule out that self-enhancement may, in some ways, underlie some implicit egotism
effects. 
A NEW MEASURE OF IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM
In the current research we used two different measures of implicit self-esteem.
In most of the reported studies, we administered a letter evaluation task in order to
calculate the name-letter effect, which seemed a useful indicator of implicit self-esteem
in the current studies as it was in many other previous studies. 
The second measure that we employed was what we called a name letter IAT.
It is a modified version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Farnham et al., 1999). The
original Self-esteem IAT is problematic because in addition to categorizing words into
valence, the self-category is used (me, not me). However, the words that are used for “not
me” are generally speaking not neutral, but refer to other people (“he”, “she” or “they”).
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The problem is, then, that to some unknown extent the implicit evaluation of others may
affect this self-esteem measure. One solution for this problem is to delete the other
category altogether and use the Single Target IAT (Wigboldus, Holland, & van
Knippenberg, 2005). Indeed, the ST-IAT has been successfully employed in the domain
of self-esteem (Holland, Wennekers, et al., in press).  
In the present dissertation we used quite a different solution for that problem.
Instead of deleting the “other” category, we created a categorization task that is very
naturally related to the “me” – “not-me” distinction. Participants were asked to indicate
whether letters were part of their name or not. In this name-letter IAT participants have to
respond with the “me” button whenever the displayed letter is part of the name, and with
the not-me button when the letter is not part of the name. Although at first sight this may
seem just another name-letter measure it may be argued to have some interesting
features that other name letters are lacking. Importantly, the IAT is mainly based on
associations with the category labels, probably to a larger extent than on the evaluations
of the exemplars that are used in the categorization process. The categorization
decision concerns whether a letter ‘belongs to me’ or ‘not to me’, which it shares with
most other self-IAT’s. To the extent that the exemplars as such contribute to the
differential evaluation effect, this measure may also share variance with the usual name
letter measure. Finally, as a predictive validity argument, one might add that this name
letter IAT successfully served as moderator in the implicit egotism effects observed in
Chapter 4 (Study 4.2). Therefore, we argue that the “name-letter” IAT constitutes a valid
measure of implicit self-esteem. Whether or not this name letter IAT is a better measure
of implicit self-esteem than other self-esteem IAT’s is up to future research.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this dissertation it was shown that implicit egotism effects -as represented in
the enhanced evaluation of objects that contain reference to the self and enhanced
evaluation of objects due to mere ownership- are crucially dependent on the participant’s
positive implicit self-evaluation. Thereby this research provides a theoretically and
empirically more solid explanation for the occurrence of these types of egotism effects. In
a way, this dissertation accomplished something that implicit egotism research so far has
not been able to do, namely complete the logical argument concerning implicit egotism
effects in the sense that it represents a spill-over of positive self-associations to anything
that is -one way or other- linked to the self (with the exception of Gawronski et al.’s (2007)
recent work on the implicit self-esteem foundations of egotism effects in the domain of
self-anchoring). This way, this dissertation contributed to settling some extant accounts.
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Another exciting contribution of the present research is that it shifted the
boundaries of what needs to be explained by introducing yet another area in which name
letter-related egotism was demonstrated: the overuse of name letters in written texts. It
was shown that the written texts that individuals produced contained more name letters
than expected on the basis of chance, which was particularly shown to be the case with
positive words. These exciting new data still await plausible and empirically verified
explanations, but the present discussion may provide the first tentative explanatory
conceptual tools to come to grips with these new findings. 
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Most people like themselves. High levels of self-esteem may have implications
for behavior and decision-making. Recent studies have shown that people tend to move
toward cities that resemble their personal names. Also, people choose jobs that have
names that resemble their own names. Furthermore, it was found that people’s decisions
to live in a particular street and to marry a particular person, are (at least partly) based on
the similarities of the names of, respectively, these streets and persons with their own
name. Thus, Michiel is more likely to live in Munstergeleen, to become a musician and to
live in the Meishagerstraat, than one would expect on the basis of chance. 
The unconscious preference for stimuli that are associated with the self was
called implicit egotism. Most people feel good about themselves. As a consequence, they
like objects that are associated with the self. Our names are stimuli that are closely
associated with our self and, therefore, the letters constituting our name, i.e., our name
letters, are highly representative for our identity. The idea underlying implicit egotism is
that positive feelings about our self result in positive feelings about anything that is
associated with our self. So, the more positive we feel about our self, the more positive
we evaluate stimuli that are more or less part of our self. Consequently, if Michiel feels
good about himself, he should show a preference for self-relevant stimuli, e.g., musician,
Meishagerstraat, and the village of Munstergeleen. The theory would also predict that if
Michiel does not feel good about himself, he should prefer neither musician, nor
Meishagerstraat, nor Munstergeleen.
However, although these feelings about oneself are a central and crucial aspect
of the theory of implicit egotism, they were not taken into account in the studies
described above. We would expect that name letter effects should only be observed for
people who feel good about themselves (i.e., have highly positive implicit self-esteem),
but not for people who feel less good or even bad about themselves (i.e., have low or
even negative implicit self-esteem). In the present thesis we aimed to investigate how
people vary in the evaluation of self-associated objects. 
In Chapter 2 we add an entirely new area to implicit egotism research. We
reasoned that if people evaluate their name letters more positively, they might use their
name letters more in texts. This hypothesis was confirmed: In three studies we showed
that people tend to overuse their name letters in written texts. In Study 2.1 it was
demonstrated that authors of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology articles use
their name letters more often in their abstracts than one would expect based on general
letter frequencies in these abstracts. In Study 2.2 we found that people not only show an
overuse of name letters in formal and scrutinized texts, but also in written texts about
more trivial everyday topics. In Study 2.3 we demonstrated that people show an overuse
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of name letters in words with a positive meaning and that people tend to avoid words with
a negative meaning. In these studies we also found that in formal situations people tend
to overuse the letters of their last name and that in informal situations people tend to
overuse the letters of their first name. However, we did not find the expected moderating
effect of implicit self-esteem. 
In Chapter 3 we investigated the moderating role of implicit self-esteem in
implicit egotism effects. In Study 3.1 participants were exposed to an advertisement of a
bicycle. Within the self-relevance condition, the name of the bike started with the first two
letters of the participant’s first name. Within the control condition the bike’s name started
with two non-name letters. Subsequently, participants evaluated the bike. Afterwards,
implicit self-esteem was measured by the name letter effect. Evaluations of the
self-referring bike were found to be more positive among high self-esteem individuals
compared to low self-esteem individuals. In Study 3.2 we replicated this effect by using
an advertisement of a DVD-player, which name was manipulated by using the first two
letters of the first name of the participants and their birthday number (in the
self-relevance condition). In this study we found that people with high self-esteem
evaluated the self-relevant DVD-player better than the player that was not self-relevant.
Across these two studies we showed that implicit evaluations of the self indeed
moderate implicit egotism effects. Products were evaluated more positively by high
self-esteem participants than low self-esteem participants when the brand name of that
product included name letters (Study 3.1) or name letters and birthday numbers (Study
3.2). These effects are in line with the idea that the degree of positivity associated with
the self moderates the strength of implicit egotism effects. In other words, products that
referred to the self were liked better by individuals who have positive implicit self
associations.
In Chapter 4 we investigated two effects that can be considered as special
manifestations of implicit egotism: the mere ownership effect and the endowment effect
(Once an object is owned, it become more attractive or valuable). In Study 4.1, we
studied the effects of implicit self-esteem on object evaluations in two conditions: In the
possession condition we gave the object to the participant for a present, while in the
control condition we did not. Subsequently, we asked participants to explicitly evaluate
the object. We predicted that implicit self-esteem was related to object evaluations in the
possession condition, but not in the control condition. The results were consistent with
this hypothesis: we found that people high in implicit self-esteem evaluated the pen when
owned more positively than the same pen when they did not own it. People low in
implicit self-esteem did not show this effect. Thus, the level of implicit self-esteem
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moderates the mere ownership effect. 
Study 4.2 followed up on this first study, by directly testing the endowment effect
(once an object is owned, it becomes more valuable) as a function of differences in
self-esteem. If the endowment effect can be partly explained by the mere ownership
effect, we would expect that implicit self-esteem would also moderate the endowment
effect. In Study 4.2 we first measured implicit self-evaluations. One or two weeks later,
participants returned to the laboratory and did or did not receive a pen as a gift. In the
possession condition, participants were asked for how much money they were willing to
sell this pen. In the control condition, they were asked how much money they wanted to
pay for this pen. As expected, we found that people with high implicit self-esteem
allocated a higher price to a pen they owned than to the same pen when they did not own
it. People low in implicit self-esteem did not allocate a higher price to the pen when they
owned it. So the endowment effect is moderated by differences in self-associations as
indicated by our implicit self-esteem measure. 
The studies in Chapter 4 provide new and convincing evidence for the crucial
role of psychological processes in the endowment effect. Differences in the allocation of
monetary value as a function of selling and buying can be partly related to loss aversion
in selling. However, since selling always implies that you assign value to something you
possess, self-evaluation processes come into play. Our research shows that people
differ in their appreciation of the things they own. Their implicit self-esteem spills over to
the things they possess. 
Together, the studies in the present dissertation offer a systematic
demonstration of the moderating role of positive self-associations in implicit egotism
effects. In four studies, we demonstrated the role of implicit self-esteem on the evaluati-
on of an object that was either self-related or not. However, this moderating role of impli-
cit self-esteem was lacking in the studies of Chapter 2 on preferential name letter use in
written texts. In Chapter 5 we elaborated on possible explanations for the differential
effects of the moderating role of positive self-associations and discussed implications and
suggestions for future research.
One contribution of the present research is that it shifted the boundaries of what
needs to be explained by introducing yet another area in which name letter-related
egotism was demonstrated: the overuse of name letters in written texts, which was
particularly shown to be the case with positive words. Moreover, this dissertation
accomplished something that implicit egotism research so far has not been able to do,
namely complete the logical argument concerning implicit egotism effects in the sense
that it represents a spill-over of positive self-associations to anything that is -one way or
another- linked to the self.
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De meeste mensen hebben een goed gevoel over zichzelf. Een hoge
zelfwaardering kan gevolgen hebben voor gedrag en keuzes. Recent onderzoek laat zien
dat mensen de neiging hebben om te verhuizen naar een plaats waarvan de naam
overeenkomsten vertoont met hun eigen naam. Ook kiezen mensen een baan die wat de
naam betreft lijkt op hun eigen naam. Bovendien laat onderzoek zien dat onze keuze voor
een bepaalde straat om in te wonen of een partner om mee te trouwen (op zijn minst
gedeeltelijk) gebaseerd is op overeenkomsten tussen onze eigen naam en
respectievelijk de straatnaam en naam van de persoon. Het is dus waarschijnlijker dat
Michiel in Munstergeleen woont, een muzikant wordt en woont in de Meishagerstraat dan
men zou mogen verwachten op basis van kans.
De onbewuste voorkeur voor stimuli die verbonden zijn met het zelf wordt
implicit egotism genoemd. De meeste mensen hebben een goed gevoel over zichzelf en
daarom vinden ze objecten aantrekkelijk die verbonden zijn aan dit zelf. Onze namen zijn
stimuli die sterk verbonden zijn met het zelf en daarom zijn de letters die onze naam
vormen (onze naamletters) zeer representatief voor onze identiteit. Het idee achter
implicit egotism is dat positieve gevoelens over onszelf resulteren in positieve gevoelens
over alles dat gerelateerd is aan het zelf.  Dus, hoe positiever we over onszelf voelen,
hoe positiever we stimuli evalueren die min of meer deel zijn van ons zelf.
Dientengevolge zou Michiel, als hij een positief gevoel over zichzelf heeft, een voorkeur
hebben voor zelfrelevant stimuli, bijvoorbeeld muzikant, Meishagerstraat en
Munstergeleen. De theorie voorspelt ook dat als Michiel niet zo’n positief gevoel over
zichzelf heeft, hij geen voorkeur zou hebben voor muzikant, Meishagerstraat of
Munstergeleen. 
Echter, ondanks het feit dat deze gevoelens over het zelf een centraal en
cruciaal aspect vormen in de implicit egotism theorie, zijn deze niet meegenomen in de
onderzoeken die hierboven beschreven zijn. We zouden verwachten dat naamletter
effecten alleen gevonden worden bij mensen die een positief gevoel hebben over
zichzelf (ofwel, een hoge impliciete zelfwaardering hebben), maar niet bij mensen die een
minder goed gevoel of zelf een slecht gevoel hebben over zichzelf (ofwel, een lage
impliciete zelfwaardering hebben). Het doel van het in dit proefschrift beschreven
onderzoek is om te bekijken hoe mensen variëren in de evaluatie van zelfgerelateerde
objecten. 
In hoofdstuk 2 voegen we een compleet nieuw gebied toe aan het onderzoek
naar implicit egotism. We redeneren dat wanneer mensen hun naamletters mooier
vinden, zij deze wellicht ook meer gebruiken in teksten. Deze hypothese werd bevestigd:
in drie studies lieten we zien dat mensen hun eigen naamletters meer gebruiken in
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geschreven teksten. In Studie 2.1 lieten we zien dat auteurs van artikelen in het Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology meer naamletters in hun samenvattingen
gebruikten dan men zou verwachten op basis van algemene letter frequenties in deze
samenvattingen. In Studie 2.2 vonden we dat mensen niet alleen meer naamletters
gebruiken in formele, goed overdachte teksten, maar ook in geschreven teksten over
meer triviale alledaagse onderwerpen. In Studie 2.3 toonden we aan dat men meer
naamletters gebruikt in woorden met een positieve betekenis, maar dat men naamletters
vermijdt in woorden met een negatieve betekenis. In deze studies vonden we ook dat
mensen de letters van hun achternaam meer gebruiken in meer formele teksten en de
letters van hun voornaam meer gebruiken in meer informele teksten. Echter, we vonden
niet de verwachte modererende rol van impliciete zelfwaardering. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we de modererende rol van impliciete
zelfwaardering in implicit egotism effecten. In Studie 3.1 lieten we proefpersonen een
advertentie zien van een fiets. In de zelfrelevantie conditie begon de naam van de fiets
met de eerste twee letters van de voornaam van de proefpersoon. In de controle
conditie begon de naam van de fiets met twee letters die niet in de (voor en achter) naam
van de proefpersoon zaten. Vervolgens werden de proefpersonen gevraagd om de fiets
te evalueren. Daarna werd de impliciete zelfwaardering gemeten door middel van
naamletter meting. De evaluaties van de fiets in de zelfrelevante conditie waren
positiever bij mensen met een hoge impliciete zelfwaardering dan bij mensen met een
lage impliciete zelfwaardering. In Studie 3.2 repliceerden we dit effect door een
advertentie te gebruiken van een DVD-speler, waarvan de naam in de zelfrelevante
conditie de eerste twee letters van de voornaam plus het getal van de dag uit de
geboortedatum bevatte. In deze studie vonden we dat bij mensen met een hoge
impliciete zelfwaardering het zelfrelevante product beter werd geëvalueerd dan de
DVD-speler in de controle conditie. In deze twee studies lieten we zien dat impliciete
zelfevaluaties inderdaad implicit egotism effecten modereren. Producten werden positie-
ver beoordeeld door mensen met een hoge impliciete zelfwaardering dan mensen met
een lage impliciete zelfwaardering wanneer de merknaam van dat product de naam
(Studie 3.1) of de naam en geboortedag (Studie 3.2) bevatte. Deze effecten zijn in lijn met
het idee dat implicit egotism effecten gemodereerd worden door de mate van positiviteit
over het zelf. Met andere woorden, producten die gerelateerd zijn aan het zelf worden
mooier gevonden door mensen met positieve impliciete zelfassociaties.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzochten we twee effecten die beschouwd kunnen worden
als twee bijzondere manifestaties van implicit egotism: het mere ownership effect en het
endowment effect (wanneer je een object bezit wordt het aantrekkelijker/waardevoller).
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In Studie 4.1 onderzochten we het effect van impliciete zelfwaardering op object
evaluaties in twee condities: in de bezit conditie gaven we het object als cadeautje aan
de proefpersoon, terwijl men in de controle conditie niets kreeg. Vervolgens vroegen we
de proefpersonen om een waarde te geven aan het product. We verwachtten dat
impliciete zelfwaardering gerelateerd zou zijn aan de object evaluatie in de bezitconditie,
maar niet in de controle conditie. De resultaten waren in lijn met deze verwachting: we
vonden dat mensen met een hoge impliciete zelfwaardering de pen mooier vonden als
deze van hun was (net gekregen dus) dan wanneer deze niet van hun was. Mensen met
een lage impliciete zelfwaardering lieten dit verschil niet zien. De hoogte van de
impliciete zelfwaardering modereert dus het mere ownership effect.  
Studie 4.2 was een vervolg op deze eerste studie, door het endowment effect
(zodra je een object bezit wordt het waardevoller) direct te onderzoeken als een functie
van verschillen in zelfwaardering. Als het endowment effect gedeeltelijk verklaard kan
worden als een mere ownership effect, dan mogen we verwachten dat impliciete
zelfwaardering het endowment effect modereert. In Studie 4.2 maten we eerst impliciete
zelfevaluaties. Een of twee weken later kwamen proefpersonen terug naar het lab en
kregen zij wel of geen pen als cadeautje. In de bezit conditie werd hen gevraagd voor
hoeveel geld ze de pen zouden verkopen. In de controle conditie werd gevraagd voor
hoeveel geld ze de pen zouden kopen. Zoals verwacht kenden mensen met een hoge
impliciete zelfwaardering een hogere prijs toe aan de pen als ze deze bezaten dan
wanneer ze dezelfde pen niet bezaten. Mensen met een lage impliciete zelfwaardering
kenden geen hogere prijs toe aan de pen wanneer ze deze bezaten. Het endowment
effect wordt dus gemodereerd door verschillen in zelfassociaties. 
De studies in hoofdstuk 4 bieden nieuw en overtuigend bewijs voor de rol van
psychologische processen in het endowment effect. Verschillen in toegekende
geldwaarde als een functie van verkopen of kopen kan slechts gedeeltelijk worden
toegeschreven aan loss aversion bij het verkopen van een object. Echter, omdat
verkopen altijd inhoud dat je een waarde toekent aan iets dat je bezit, komt zelfevaluatie
in het spel. Ons onderzoek laat zien dat mensen verschillen in de mate waarin ze dingen
die ze bezitten waarderen. De impliciete zelfwaardering beïnvloedt de waardering van
wat men bezit. 
Alles bij elkaar genomen bieden de onderzoeken in het huidige proefschrift een
systematische demonstratie van de modererende rol van positieve zelfassociaties in
implicit egotism effecten. In vier studies lieten we de rol van impliciete zelfwaardering zien
op de evaluatie van een object dat zelfrelevant was of niet. Echter, deze modererende rol
van impliciete zelfwaardering miste in de studies in hoofdstuk 2 over preferentieel
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naamletter gebruik in geschreven teksten. In hoofdstuk 5 gaan we in op de mogelijke
verklaringen voor deze verschillende effecten van de (modererende) rol van positieve
zelfassociaties en bespreken we implicaties en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek. 
Eén bijdrage van dit onderzoek is dat we de grenzen hebben verbreed van het
onderzoek naar implicit egotism effecten door een gebied toe te voegen waar
naamletter gerelateerd egotism gedemonstreerd werd: het bovengemiddeld gebruik van
naamletters in geschreven teksten, wat vooral het geval is bij positieve woorden. Met dit
proefschrift is daarnaast iets bereikt dat implicit egotism onderzoek tot nog toe niet heeft
kunnen bewerkstelligen, namelijk het sluitend maken van de logische beredenering
betreffende implicit egotism, door te laten zien dat er sprake is van het ‘overlopen’ van
positieve zelfassociaties naar alles dat op de een of andere manier aan het zelf
gerelateerd is.
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Hier ligt het dan. Ik kan het bijna niet geloven dat ik dit aan het schrijven ben,
want dat betekent dat mijn proefschrift nu echt klaar is. Ik heb het zo lang mogelijk
proberen uit te stellen, maar nu is mijn academische tijd en vooral ook mijn Nijmeegse
tijd dan echt afgerond. Ik kijk er met heel veel plezier op terug! 
Een dankwoord is een vast onderdeel in elk proefschrift. Dat betekent echter
niet dat ik de mensen plichtmatig bedank. De mensen die hieronder genoemd worden
hebben -direct of indirect- echt iets bijgedragen in de tijd dat ik aan mijn proefschrift
gewerkt heb en hen komt dan ook alle lof toe. Het is eigenlijk de bedoeling dat je de
mensen bedankt die een directe bijdrage hebben geleverd aan het proefschrift, maar je
zult zien dat er ook veel mensen bedankt worden die een indirecte bijdrage hebben
geleverd aan dit proefschrift door mij zo nu en dan de nodige afleiding te verschaffen. 
Ik wil beginnen met degene die een centrale rol heeft gespeeld in mijn loopbaan
als sociaal psycholoog: Rob Holland. Rob was mijn begeleider tijdens het eerstejaars
practicum sociale psychologie. In mijn groepje onderzochten we of het mogelijk was om
bij mensen het concept ‘milieubewustheid’ te ‘primen’ door ze naar een wit
wegwerpbekertje te laten kijken en vervolgens maten we of mensen (tijdelijk)
milieu-bewuster werden. In het laatste jaar van mijn studie sociale psychologie liep ik
stage bij Rob. Tijdens deze ontzettend leuke stage deed ik onderzoek naar de waarde –
expressieve functie van attitudes. Mede door het enorme enthousiasme van Rob raakte
ik geïnteresseerd in (impliciete) zelfwaardering, implicit egotism en belangrijker nog:
onderzoek doen. En dus werd ik Aio in Nijmegen en na 2 jaar veranderden we het
project inhoudelijk en werd Rob mijn begeleider. De eerste studie die we samen deden
in het kader van mijn proefschrift was meteen een succes. Robs enthousiasme was erg
aanstekelijk en binnen een jaar waren alle data voor het proefschrift binnen. Het
schrijven verliep vervolgens iets trager, ook omdat ik het proefschrift af moest maken
naast een normale baan, maar Rob bleef enthousiasmeren en activeren. En uiteindelijk
met succes, anders was ik dit nu niet aan het schrijven dus. Rob, ik wil je bedanken voor
de belangrijke rol die je tijdens mijn studie en mijn promotietraject hebt gespeeld. Je was
er altijd, bleef enthousiast ook al duurde het soms maanden voor je weer iets van me zag
en uiteindelijk hebben we een product neergezet waar ik enorm trots op ben! Heel erg
bedankt voor alles en dat biertje gaan we binnenkort toch echt maar eens drinken hè!
Uiteraard heeft Rob mij niet alleen begeleid. Ik had een geweldige promotor: Ad
van Knippenberg. Ad, je was een erg fijne promotor!  Er is niemand anders waarmee je
zo prettig over onderzoek kunt brainstormen als met jou. Je hebt altijd goede ideeën over
onderzoek, beschikt over een enorme hoeveelheid kennis, je (Engelse) taalvaardigheid
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is indrukwekkend en je bent ook nog eens heel goed in het sturen van een project.
Bovendien ben je ook nog eens goed in het organiseren van BBQ’s! En natuurlijk bedankt
voor je koffie! Ad, heel erg bedankt voor je goede ideeën, je geduld en dat je speciaal
voor mij naar het klooster in Duitsland kwam rijden om feedback te geven op mijn
teksten! 
Natuurlijk wil ik ook alle andere (oud-)collegae uit Nijmegen bedanken!
Allereerst natuurlijk Roos, omdat je mij samen met Ad de moeite waard vond om aan te
nemen als Aio. Er is niemand die zo goed wetenschappelijk onderzoek kan vertalen naar
alledaagse dingen zoals jij dat kunt. We hebben een aantal mooie onderzoeken gedaan
en nog steeds zijn we bezig met data met betrekking tot de eigenschappen van het
naamletter effect. We hebben daarnaast heel veel plezier gehad in de tijd dat ik bij jou
Aio was. Met name het ‘Roos-groepje’ was altijd erg gezellig! En natuurlijk fijn dat je toen
ook Mariëlle hebt aangenomen, zodat er een heuse romance kon ontstaan op de
Nijmeegse werkvloer, die jij dan weer met veel interesse volgde. 
Daarnaast heb ik veel lol gehad met Harm, mijn buurman op de uni. Vooral je
droge gevoel voor humor was erg aanstekelijk. En het was iedere zomer erg gezellig om
samen de Tour de France via internet te volgen! Je kwam ook vaak met goede ideeën,
vooral over het programmeren van experimenten in Authorware. En nog steeds hoor ik
vaak ‘Can’t touch this’, de melding die jouw computer gaf als er nieuwe mail binnenkwam.
Ik wil ook graag Miquelle bedanken, waarmee we heel wat uurtjes gezelligheid
hebben gehad. Miquelle, met jou is het altijd goed om een biertje mee te drinken. En we
waren natuurlijk ook nog even roommates op de uni, wat ook erg gezellig was. 
Severine wil ik graag bedanken voor de vele uurtjes gezelligheid in de kroeg, bij
wielerwedstrijden, in de Efteling, tijdens schrijfweken, of gewoon thuis tijdens een lekker
etentje. En natuurlijk voor het ter beschikking stellen van je kamer als ik nog even niet
terecht kon bij Rob.
Een andere collega die ik erg dankbaar ben is Mariëlle, om het brainstormen
over onderzoek, het samenwerken bij experimenten, maar ook omdat je me vaak van het
werk heeft gehouden en voor de vele gezellige uitstapjes naar de Aspo, de verschillende
KLI-bijeenkomsten en cursussen en congressen in San Sebastian, Parijs, Lissabon,
Würzburg en New Orleans. Je was mijn allerfijnste collega! 
Uiteraard wil ik ook de anderen bedanken voor hun gezelligheid,
brainstormsessies, congresvertier, tips, kritiek en snelle doch immer gezellige lunches
(in willekeurige volgorde): Jacqueline, Rick, Berlinda, Marina, Martijn, Ron, Dirk, Daniël,
Aafje, Madelijn, Johan, Marieke, Ischa, Wendy, Jaap, Mathilde, Mark en Bjorn. 
Marijke, jou wil ik in het bijzonder danken voor alles wat je voor me gedaan hebt.
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Of het nou het regelen van proefpersoongeld was, het zorgen voor een computer of
bureaustoel, het doorsturen van post, het regelen van sleutels of het regelen van een reis
naar het buitenland, jij deed het allemaal perfect! Je bent een droomsecretaresse!
Ik wil ook graag de collegae bij de Aspo, het KLI en het BSI bedanken voor de
leerzame en altijd gezellige bijeenkomsten! Daarnaast wil ik ook graag alle
proefpersonen die aan mijn experimenten hebben meegedaan bedanken!
Ik werk inmiddels alweer 3 jaar bij Prismant. Mijn collegae bij Prismant (en CC
Zorgadviseurs en Walvis ConsultingGroep) wil ik bedanken voor de steun die jullie mij
geboden hebben. Guus, dank je dat je het mogelijk hebt gemaakt dat ik mijn proefschrift
gedeeltelijk ‘in de tijd van de baas’ heb kunnen afmaken. Al mijn collegae van
Arbeidsmarkt & HRM, bedankt dat jullie altijd het vertrouwen hebben gehouden dat ik het
af zou maken, dat jullie me steeds hebben aangemoedigd en me twee keer een week vrij
lieten nemen om me terug te trekken in een klooster om aan mijn proefschrift te werken.
En voor jullie steun en het koffie halen tijdens de laatste zware weken toen mijn
proefschrift naar de drukker moest! Bedankt (eilandgenote) Daphne, Ineke, Theo,
Francisca, Elsbeth, Willem, Frank, Jolanda, Thérèse, Jetske, Sander, Jan, Hans, Alice en
natuurlijk Ton, die steeds het belang van een proefschrift en promotie op waarde wist te
schatten. Daniel en Mariel, als oud-eilandgenoten bij BAS, dank voor de ontzettende
gezelligheid die wij altijd op donderdag hadden op ons eiland en voor het mij wegwijs
maken en het mij naar de zin maken toen ik bij Prismant kwam werken. Ook alle andere
BAStaards, bedankt voor de leerzame tijd! De medebestuursleden van de
Personeelsvereniging wil ik danken voor de gezelligheid die we altijd weer hebben bij
onze activiteiten! Heel erg bedankt Yvonne, Sylke, Tamara, Rianne en Percy. Ook Helen,
Marjoke en Maaike, dank je wel voor de vele gezellige uurtjes en lekker eten. En
natuurlijk ook alle andere collegae bij Prismant, Walvis en CCZ! En iedereen die
regelmatig naast of tegenover me staat aan de Prismant tafeltennistafel, bedankt voor de
ontspanning en inspanning! 
Wat betreft de ontspanning kom ik natuurlijk heel erg aan mijn trekken bij
Voncken Nature Sport in Sprimont in de Belgische Ardennen. Het is altijd erg fijn om het
computerscherm even te mogen verruilen voor het Ardens groen en de rotsen van
Chanxhe! Maar het allerfijnst zijn daar natuurlijk mijn VNS-collegae! Het is voor mij
thuiskomen als ik de instructeurshut binnenkom en verwelkomd wordt door mijn
VNS-collega-instructeurs. Bedankt Gerrit, Jacques, Carine, John, José, Tonnie,
Fabienne, Frank, Robert, Filip, Steven, Joris, Math, Roel, Melanie, Rob, Wout, Willem,
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Roy, Ron, Ton, Francois, Fransje, Martijn, Katrien, Johan, Els, Jeroen, Phili, Dennis,
Philippe, Herm, Jan, Ron, John, Redgy voor de gezelligheid, de leerzame dagen, de fijne
avonden onder het genot van een kaasje en een wijntje en de oergezellige
instructeursweekenden (tijdens het laatste instructeursweekend heb ik mijn proefschrift
al moeten verdedigen tegenover een zeer kundige commissie!). 
Het houdt niet op wat de ontspanning betreft, want ik heb natuurlijk nog een
andere hobby en dat is samen met mijn vrienden carnaval vieren in het dorp waar ik
vandaan kom: Hoensbroek (Gebrook, of Hoenshose voor de kenners). Samen met deze
goede vriendjes heb ik in 1994 de carnavalsgroep de ‘Breuker Neutjes’ opgericht en we
hebben ieder jaar heel veel plezier samen. Het is ieder jaar weer een feest om een week
lang samen de traditie van de carnaval met jullie te vieren! Ook al is een deel van het
feesten omgezet in gezellige weekenden in de Ardennen, bouwen we niet meer van die
grote wagens, is alweer de 7e kleine Neut in aankomst en wordt er op een gemiddelde
carnavalsavond meer fris dan bier gedronken, we hebben het altijd supergezellig met z’n
allen! Bedankt Lea, Bert, Koen, Eefje, Michiel, Hilde, Marijn, Melanie, Arnau, Marcel,
Cindy, Emma, Kim, Jeroen, Lieke, Kris, Chris, Simone, Lucienne, Anna en Daniel!
Er is natuurlijk ook een aantal vrienden dat ik heel graag wil bedanken voor alles
wat ze voor me gedaan hebben. En natuurlijk voor het feit dat ze mijn proefschrift altijd
en consequent ‘scriptie’ hebben genoemd!
Om te beginnen Michiel en Hilde. Bij jullie kan ik altijd terecht, of het nou om een
slaapplek in het Zuiden gaat, om een gezellig avondje, een lekker biertje of een goed
gesprek, jullie deur staat altijd open! En Michiel, ik ken jou van al mijn vrienden het langst
(inmiddels al 23 jaar) en ik vind het een grote eer dat jij mijn paranimf bent op 15 juni
2009! 
Karen en Martijn, bedankt voor alle gezellige weekendjes Ardennen,
spelletjesavonden, bierproefavonden, Zomerfeesten in Nijmegen, BBQ’s,
wielerwedstrijden, criteriums, pingpongwedstijden, Sylvesterparty’s, etentjes en natuurlijk
de altijd gezellige festivals! Het is altijd supergezellig en het is nooit ‘standaard’ met
jullie! Mart, omdat ik weet dat je nogal nostalgisch bent: wij kennen elkaar inmiddels
precies 20 jaar!
Lea en Bert, dank jullie voor de gezellige weekendjes, de logeerpartijtjes bij
jullie, de goede gesprekken ’s avonds op het ‘terras’ en het feit dat jullie altijd een
luisterend oor hebben zonder meteen een mening klaar te hebben!
Edward en Esmée, bedankt voor alle gezellige avonden, Catanavondjes,
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bieravondjes, weekendjes weg en natuurlijk ook de vele interessante en minder
interessante discussies! Ik ben benieuwd hoe jullie tweede kindje gaat heten (ik verwacht
wel weer een namenbrainstormavond hè)!
Melanie en Remco, heel erg bedankt voor de leuke dagjes in de Ardennen, de
mooie wandelingen, de lekkere etentjes, de oud-en-nieuw feestjes en voor het laten
proeven van heerlijke wijnen en voor alle geouwehoer erover! 
Ik dank ook de familie Smeets voor alles wat ze voor me gedaan heeft. In het
bijzonder dank ik mijn petekind Dick en Piet, Lia, Luuk, Loes en Anne voor jullie warmte
en gezelligheid en dat bij jullie altijd alles mogelijk is! En mijn oma voor het feit dat ze de
leukste oma was en een voorbeeld voor velen. En natuurlijk mijn andere petekind Naiche.
Ook wil ik graag mijn ‘schoonfamilie’, Peter, Margarita, Ron, Wijmie, Magda,
Marcel, Marian en Frank  bedanken voor de gezelligheid, hun betrokkenheid en het altijd
vol interesse vragen hoe het nou met mijn proefschrift ging (het is af!). En natuurlijk dank
voor de gezellige avonden en middagen! 
Mijn speciale dank gaat uit naar twee mensen zonder wie dit proefschrift er
überhaupt nooit was geweest: mijn ouders. Pap en mam, dank jullie voor jullie steun, mijn
hele leven lang. En dank jullie dat jullie mij hebben geleerd om eigenwijs te zijn en mijn
eigen weg te gaan, ook al is dat niet altijd de snelste! 
Mijn grootste dank gaat uit naar mijn lieve Mariëlle. Ondanks dat je de Aiobaan
waar ik in eerste instantie op solliciteerde voor mijn neus wegkaapte (Roos nam jou aan
in plaats van mij) werden we collega’s in Nijmegen. Het feit dat we op dezelfde vakgroep
werkten was niet altijd even productief, maar het was wel altijd gezellig. En we hadden
natuurlijk alle tijd om het ’s avonds over onderzoeksdesigns, analyses en artikelen te
hebben! 
Dank je dat je altijd het vertrouwen in me hebt gehouden dat ik het wel zou
afmaken. En dank je voor de vele uren brainstormen over onderzoek. En dank je voor
het draaien van studie 2.3 in Leiden. En dank je dat je altijd zo goed om weet te gaan
met mijn af en toe wat nukkige buien. En dank je voor je steun in de laatste weken. En
dank je dat je mijn paranimf wil zijn. En dank je voor het feit dat je mijn vriendin wil zijn!
Kortom, wat zou ik moeten zonder jou? 
R S
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Raymond Christiaan Konrad Hubert werd geboren op 21 juni 1973 in het De
Weverziekenhuis (tegenwoordig Atrium Medisch Centrum Heerlen) in Heerlen. Hij bracht
zijn jeugd als echte ‘Breuker jong’ door in het Limburgse Hoensbroek. Daar ging hij
achtereenvolgens naar peuterspeelzaal Klein Duimpje, de Allessandro Voltaschool (later
Basisschool De Regenboog) en in 1991 haalde hij zijn Havodiploma aan het
Broeklandcollege (tegenwoordig Emmacollege). Drie jaar later, in 1994, haalde hij het
Vwo-diploma aan het Bernardinuscollege in Heerlen. In datzelfde jaar verruilde hij het
mooie Limburg voor Nijmegen, waar hij begon aan de studie psychologie aan de
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. Na een zeer gezellige studententijd met veel feesten,
jolijt, werk, vertier en   studeren ontving hij in 2000 de bul in de Sociale Psychologie. In
2001 begon hij als Aio (Assistent in opleiding) aan de vakgroep Sociale Psychologie in
Nijmegen. (Tijdens dit Aioschap veranderde de naam van de universiteit in Radboud
Universiteit, waar Raymond uiteraard zeer tevreden mee was.) Met het boekje dat u nu
in handen heeft is deze fase afgerond en komt een einde aan zijn ‘Nijmeegse periode’.
Sinds 2006 werkt hij als onderzoeker bij Prismant (partner van CC Zorgadviseurs en
Walvis ConsultingGroep) in Utrecht. In zijn vrije tijd is hij buitensportinstructeur bij
Voncken Nature Sport in Sprimont, België. 
R S

R SR
S
R
SR
S
R
S
R
S
R S
RS
R S
R S
R
S
R
S
R
S
R S
R
S
R
S
Raymond Smeets
On the preference for 
self-related entities: the role of
positive self-associations in
implicit egotism effects
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On the preference for self-related entities: the
role of positive self-associations in implicit 
egotism effects
The unconscious preference for stimuli that are associated with the self was
called implicit egotism. The idea underlying implicit egotism is that positive feelings
about our self result in positive feelings about anything that is associated with our self.
So, the more positive we feel about our self, the more positive we evaluate stimuli that
are more or less part of our self. However, although these feelings about oneself are a
central and crucial aspect of the theory of implicit egotism, they were not taken into
account in the research on implicit egotism so far. In the present thesis the aim was to
investigate how people vary in the evaluation of self-associated objects as a function of
positivity of self associations.
One contribution of the present thesis is that it shifted the boundaries of what
needs to be explained by introducing yet another area in which name letter-related
egotism was demonstrated: the overuse of name letters in written texts. Moreover, this
dissertation accomplished something that implicit egotism research so far has not been
able to do, namely complete the logical argument concerning implicit egotism effects in
the sense that it represents a spill-over of positive self-associations to anything that is
-one way or another- linked to the self.
ISBN: 978-90-9024290-3    www.raymondsmeets.nl
